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THE IMPACTS OF CHANGES IN THE LEADERSHIP OF THE TWO 
COMMUNIST POWERS ON NORTH KOREA 
An Abstract 
ii  
The Democratic People ' s  Republic of Korea was es tab­
lished in September 1 9 48 ,  under the Soviet military occupa­
tion .  Until  Stalin ' s  death in 1 9 5 3 ,  Soviet influence was 
predominant in North Korea because of Stalin as wel l  as Soviet 
power . Stalin, who viewed North Korea as important to the 
security interests of Russia to defend the Asian front , hand­
picked Kim I l-sung and supported him to rise to power for the 
purpose of the Soviet control over the North. Kim Il-sung 
adopted the Stalinist  model of communism which still persists . 
The Stalin-Kim relationship and North Korean military and 
economic dependence on Rus sia led to Pyongyang as a Soviet 
satellite in the prewar period , while  China was preoccupied 
with its internal situation. 
However,  Kim, through history , obtained nationalistic 
consciousness  not to rely too closely upon any one foreign 
power - in particular, he was aware of the Soviet economic 
exploitation during the 1 9 45-50 years , which produced Kim ' s  
i i i  
postwar goal of national independence through internal poli­
tical and economic consolidation. The Korean War had s timu­
lated North Korean nationalism , but had left the country eco­
nomically more dependent on Russia and China than it was be­
fore the war. 
The death of Stalin ended the special Stalin-Kim re­
lationship and thus supported the North Korean efforts to be 
independent . Khrushchev placed less  value on the DPRK and 
troubled Kim Il-sung , who believed in Stalinism and , l ike Mao ,  
the policy of the "united front" against "imperiali sm" , with 
his doctrinal innovation in 1 9 5 6 : peaceful co-exi stence , de­
Stalinization and anti-personality cults - the year of 1 95 6  
marked the beginning of the Sino-Soviet dispute . The inter­
vention of the Chinese People ' s  Volunteers in the Korean War 
and its postwar presence in the North along with Chinese ex­
tensive economic assistance served for Kim to neutralize the 
Soviet control over the DPRK . All this led Pyongyang to align 
itself in 1 962-64 with the Chines e  in the intensifying Sino­
Soviet confl i c t ,  despite the North's attempts to remain neu­
tral . 
By the fall of Khrushchev in 1 964, the DPRK found it­
self  in serious economic difficulties and political isolation, 
because of KhLushchev ' s  pres sure to isolate North Korea , cut­
down of economic aid and termination of military assistance 
to retaliate Pyongyang standing behind the Chines e ,  whi le the 
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People ' s  Republic of China could not afford to meet the North 
Korean needs . 
The Brezhnev-Kosygin leadership ' s  stress on the im­
proved Soviet position in Asia brought about a radical change 
in North Korean relations with the two communi st powers . Seek­
ing its national interests in need of competing with South 
Korea to reunify the Korean peninsula under the North ' s  lea­
dershi p ,  North Korea, ideologically closer to the more revo­
lutionary Chine s e ,  was t i l t ing toward Moscow and the Soviet 
political , economic and military assistance was resumed. How­
ever , Pyongyang made clear North Korea ' s  independence in the 
Communi st bloc by rejecting both the Soviet "revisionism" 
and the Chinese "dogmati sm " ,  and underlining Juche idea(  s e l f­
reliance ) . 
Mao ' s  negative reaction to Pyongyang ' s  turnabout and 
his Cultural Revolution drastically worsened the Sino-North 
Korean relations . At the end of the Cultural Revolution in 
1 9 6 9 , the Pyongyang-Be i j ing close contacts began to revive 
with Mao ' s  new pragmatic policy to counteract the growing 
Soviet influence in Asia,  and further improved with Chine se 
efforts ,  such as diplomatic and economic ass i s tance and the 
first arms deliveries s ince 1 9 5 3 ,  to counterbalance the un­
settling effect on the North of the Sino-American detent e .  
I n  the interest of drawing Pyongyang closer to Moscow, the 
USSR increased its economic , m i l itary and pol itical.support 
to the DPRK , and the Soviet-North Korean relations remained 
v 
clos e .  The North, thus, had reverted to i t s  pol i c y  of middle 
road between Moscow and Bei jing . Since then, facing the 
steadi l y  intensifying Sino-Soviet rift, North Korea in the 
1970s had continued to pursue equidis tance stand toward the 
two neighbors to gain best beni fits,  but with s l ightly closer 
ties with China. 
In the mid 1 9 70s,  certain strains in Soviet -North 
Korean ties emerged and Soviet mili tary aid was decreasing . 
The DPRK could not gain support from both powers for i t s  mili­
tant pol i c y  to uni f y  the peninsul a .  In spite o f  i t s  struggles 
for sel f-reliant economy, North Korea was s t i l l  in need o f  
Sino-Soviet support especial l y  to solve i t s  unexpected seri­
ous problems of foreign debt s .  
Therefore, in the post-Mao era, Pyongyang has main­
tained i t s  pragmatic balancing act between the two countrie s .  
Since the late 1970s when with Deng ' s  united front foreign 
policies against Rus s ia and Brezhnev's e f forts to encircle 
China in the face of a poss ible Sino -American-Japane se a l l i ­
ance, North Korea took on renewed i mportance to both Beijing 
and Moscow, the DPRK has been wooed by its respect ive neigh­
bor powers seeking Pyongyang being behind each side . In the 
1 9 7 8 -79 period, despite Pyongyang ' s  unhappiness with Beijing ' s  
pos t-Mao foreign and domestic policies, the North moved closer 
to the Chinese and dis tanced i t s e l f  further from the Soviets 
mainly because of Chinese new economic aid . However , the Chi­
nese aid not enough to meet North Korean expectations and Kim ' s  
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deepening concern over Deng's polici e s ,  such as de-Maoization 
and the growing l inks with the U . S .  and Japan, moved the DPRK 
during the 1 9 80-81 years to lean to the friendly Sovie t s .  In 
1 9 8 2 , the Sino-North Korean ties refirmed as China strongly 
courted Pyongyang through its increased economic aid,  unusual 
military assi stance and support for Kim ' s  success ion plan. 
In November, the Kim I l -sung regime expre s sed to the 
new Yuri Andropov leadership in Moscow, that indicated to 
continue Soviet military buildup , the North ' s  interest in 
closer relations with the Russians . Pyongyang reaffirmed i t s  
equidis tant posture toward the PRC and the USSR . 
In conclusion, al though the Moscow-Bei jing normal i za­
tion talks has been proceeding since last October , the old 
Sino-Soviet all iance i s  unl ike l y  to revive . The two neighbor 
powers will continue to put strategic value on the North . 
Pyongyang ' s  needs for economic and mili tary as well as poli­
tical support from both China and the Sovi et Union wi l l  remain 
to achieve its supreme goal of the reunification of Korea. 
I t  is most l ikel y  that North Korea will maintain to walk on 
a tightrope between the two communist countries to seek i t s  
own national intere s t s . 
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INTRODUCTION 
The decease of Brezhnev in November 1 982, like Stalin ' s  
death or Khrushchev ' s  fall, terminated a poli tical era . The 
new Yuri Andropov leadership in Moscow, amid internal power 
struggles,  is also capable of swi tching their policies over­
night , al though basically they are facing the same problems 
as Brezhnev did . 
A modest warming after more than 20 years o f  cool re­
lations between Beijing and Moscow s howed in ear l y  1982.  
Since Chine se national interests would be better served by a 
limited rapprochement with the Sovi et Union, Beijing seemed 
to be looking forward to the post-Brezhnev era . A number o f  
notable events between the two communist powers have taken 
place since the start o f  last year . On October S, the first 
formal official talks in the three years were held in Bei jing 
with China ' s  offer to renew uncond itional negotiation with 
Moscow. The Sino-Soviet thaw has been proceeding, an event 
with long-term, extensive impl ications for the course o f  in­
ternational relations as a whole . By the end o f  1982,  while 
til ting toward Japan and the West on an economic level, the 
PRC had moved more to the middle posit ion between Washington 
and Moscow in the diplomatic and s trategic fields t han at any 
time since 1 9 7 2 .  Uncertainty about the Sino-American rela­
tionship and displeasure with U . S .  foreign policy in general 
might have contributed to the Chinese shift in its Soviet pol-
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l icy.  
The effects on North Korea o f  the Chinese-Russian se­
paration which began with the end of the Stalin era have been 
far-reaching . Pyongyang's problems with China and the Soviet 
Union have vari ed in acccordance with the trends of Sino­
Soviet conflict . On the whole, the North has been able to 
manage these situations to its own advantage . Polycentrism 
in the Communi s t  world made it poss ible for Kim I l - s ung to 
establish North Korea ' s  Juche ideology (sel f-relianc e )  and 
independence within the bloc . The DPRK, having the supreme 
goal o f  reunification in the peninsula under the North ' s  lead­
ership, has sought p ragmatic, equidis tant stand toward Beijing 
and Moscow since the earl y 1 9 7 0 s , to procure as much support 
as poss ible from the two communist powers wi thout sacrific ing 
its independence .  I f  the Sino-Soviet detente is establi shed, 
the Pyongyang regime should modify its pos ture between the two 
neighbor countries . Meanwhile, Kim I l -sung who was born in 
1912  pos sesses a successor ques tion - the creation of the 
first Communist monarchy - which remains unsolved in the in­
ternational communist movement . Thus , the present era i s  
called "an e ra o f  crisis and unce rtainty" . 
In this the s i s ,  the main purpose i s  to seek to clear 
away some o f  the uncertainties in North Korean future rela­
tions in the new si tuation with the Soviet Union and China by 
examing the historical impacts of the advent of the new lead­
erships in the two powers on the DPRK . 
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This paper will first anal yze the evolution of North 
Korean relations with the Soviet Union and China until the 
death.""'. of Stalin in 1 95 3 ,  including the predominant role o f  
Rus s ia in the birth o f  the DPRK , Chinese prewar l ittle influ­
ence on the North , and the two ne ighbour countries in the 
Korean War . 
In the second chapter , North Korea in Khrushchev ' s  
Rus s ia ( 1 95 4-64) , an attempt is made to deal with Kim 11-sung's 
efforts following the war to strengthen domes t ic power basis 
for the country ' s  independence through political and economic 
reconsolidation, and the S ino-Soviet postwar economic contri­
but ion . This chapter also examines the Kim Il-sung leader­
ship ' s  changing s tand and policies after the Stalin ' s  death 
toward the two communist powers in the face of the widening 
S ino-Soviet schism. It focuses on the North ' s  attempts to 
hold a neutral road between the two powers , the growing Chi­
nese leverage over the DPRK , and the negative resul ts o f  the 
North Korean al ignment with China in the years of 1 962-64 . 
Chapter three attempts to discuss Pyongyang ' s  favor­
able responses to the Kosygin-Brezhnev leadership ' s  new policy 
and in return deteriorating S ino-North Korean links during 
Mao ' s  Cultural Revolution ( 1 966-68 ) .  Res tored friendship be­
tween Pyongyang and Beijing with the end of the Cultural Re­
volution in China is also analyzed . Subsequent s tudy explores 
North Korea's pragmatic middle course up to 1 976 Mao ' s  death , 
in the s teadily intensifying S ino-Soviet dispute and in the 
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Washington-Bei jing limited detent e .  
The fourth chapter is devoted to a survey o f  Pyong­
yang ' s  vacilating equidi stance since Mao depending upon the 
demands of the North ' s  own intere sts . North Korean shift 
from closer ties with China, which Pyongyang haB maintained 
throughout the 1 9 7 0s, to mild leaning toward the Soviets in 
the 1980-81 period i s  reviewed. The survey includes the Kim 
11-sung regime ' s  attitudes in the new polit ical era after the 
pas sing away of Brezhnev, along with the warming.Sino-North 
Korean relations of last year . 
This the s i s  tries to make clear the variations emerged 
with the new leaderships in the attitudes and policies of the 
three communist countries, and the factors which influenced 
Pyongyang ' s  moves from one side to the other . 
The sources employed in thi s paper are largely vari­
ous books and articles in periodical s ,  newspapers and serial s ,  
and some U . S .  government document s .  The major problem was 
that the primary source was not available even through inter­
l i brary loan, such as Foreign Broadcasting Information Ser­
vice from late 1 9 8 2  up to present and the Korean Workers ' 
Party organ, Nodong Shinmoon , on which most North Korean 
studies have heavi l y  relied.  
CHAPTER I 
PYONGYANG'S RELATIONS WITH MOSCOW AND BEIJING 
DURING THE STALIN ERA 
Rus s ia and Pre-war North Korea 
With the Japanese surrender on August 15, 1945, the 
Soviet Union occupied North Korea and moved to influence 
5 
North Korean affairs through the control of the personnel 
and the political apparatus established under the Soviet au-
thorities in P yongyang, and the reliance of the North Korean 
economy and armed forces on day-to-day imputs from Rus s ia. 
The Democratic P eople's Republic of Korea was inaugurated on 
September 9, 1948. In October 1948, the Soviet Union became 
the first country to recognize the DPRK. The Soviet early 
succe s s  in organizing a pro-Soviet regime i n  North Korea was 
due largely to fortuitous circumstance : 
In the confus ion of the North Korean political scene 
1Chong-sik Lee, Korea n  Workers' Party : A Short � (Stan­
ford : Hoover Institution Press, 1978), p:i!;The-Korean �st Party, 
first founded as an underground secret organization in April 1925 and 
dissolved in 1928 because of factional strife within the party, was re­
organized in 1945. Dae-sook Suh, Documents of Korean Camunism, 1918-
1948 (princeton, N.J. : Princeton Uriiversicy-Press ,  1970), pp. 109-112 
a.ncT'"'"475. 
in 1945, North Korea lacked indigenous political groupings 
strong enough to oppose to the Soviet control. The Soviets 
chose an indirect form of control by establishing an osten-
sibly auton6mous political apparatus composed solely of Ko-
6 
reans. The Soviet Koreans under close control of the Soviet 
Union played a crucial role in facilitating the Russian in-
fluence. 
There were five major political groups of varying po-
litical strength in early post-World War II North Korea 1) 
the Russianized Koreans who in most cases had been born in 
the Soviet Union; 2) Kim Il-sung and his comrade known as the 
Kapsan faction who had been in Russia merely during the war­
time period; 3) the non-Communist nationalists; 4 ) the dome­
stic Communists; 5) the Yenan group who returned from China.2 
3 The Soviet occupation forces brought the Kapsan group, 
which was headed by Kim Il-sung who led small partisan bands 
in Manchuria between 1 9 32 and 1941, into North Korea along 
;_obert R. Sirnrons , The Strained Alliance : Peking, Pyongyang, 
t-t>scow and the Politics of the Korean Civil War (New York : The Free 
Press, IDS}, pp. 23-25; �ooert A. Scaiapino am Chong-sik Lee, Carmmi.sm 
in Korea, Part I (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972), pp. 
'3'f4=23; For the relationship between the Chinese and Korean Coom.mists, 
see Chong-sik Lee, ''Korean Ccmrun:ists and Yenan," The China Quarterly, 
no. 9 (January-March 1962),pp. 182-92. 
3nae-sook Suh, The Korean Corrrrunist t-bvement, 1918-1948 (Prince­
ton: Princeton Universityt>'ress, 1968), pp. 281-93. This was a small 
group of Manchurian-Koreans who had been a part of the Chinese Corrrrunist 
forces in Manchuria in the 1930s, were expelled by the Japanese into the 
USSR where they remained in a training school until 1945, and returned 
to the North as officers in the Soviet Far Eastern Army. 
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with the Soviet -Koreans . 4 Kim I l - sung had never been involved 
in the Korean Communist movement and was virtuall y  unknown t o  
the Sovi ets or the Koreans up until 1 94 5 . Kim was sel ected 
and supported to be a leader of North Korea by Stalin in re-
turn for primary Soviet influenc e .  The Sovi ets considered 
that Kim, having limited political experi ence , would be pro­
Russian to serve them. 5 The c oncentration of the old Commu-
nists in the South to consolidate political force led Kim I l ­
sung and h i s  comrades to prominant pos itions i n  the North . 6 
The Soviet -Koreans and the Kapsan group gained con-
trol first within the Korean Communi s t  Party . The Yenan fac-
tion at first refused to join the Soviet -dominated Communi s t  
Party and organized the New People ' s  Party. The Korean Work­
ers ' Party was formed in mid-1 94 6 to unite the pol i tical 
groups . In 1 949, Kim I l -sung emerged as the leader of the 
7 party. 
4 1he Soviet census showed about 200 ,000 Korean residents in 1945. 
It had been esti mated that 30,000 of these returned with the Soviet forces. 
see Philip Rudolph, North Korea's Pol itical and Economic Structure (New 
York : International Secretariat, Institute �acific Relations, 1959) , 
p. 2 6. 
5Chong-sik Lee, "Kim Il-sung of North Korea , Asian Survey, vol . 
7 ,  no. 6 ( June 1967 ) ,  p. 378. 
6nae-sook Suh, �· cit . ,  p. 301 . 
7 Chong-sik Lee, "Politics in North Korea : Pre-Korean War 
Stage ," 1he China Q.iarterly, no. 14 ( April-June 1963), p. 10. 
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In short, the full support by Stalin and the presence 
of Russian occupation forces were the major factors for Kim ' s  
rise to power , along with his pol itical ski l l s .  Kim Il-sung 
successfully consolidated his political power by us ing Stali n ' s  
tools : purges o f  rival leaders , propaganda,  viol ence and the 
absorption of rival groups . 8 Kim adopted the Stalini s t  model 
of communism which makes challenges to overthrow the political 
leader va stly difficult by posing public prestige and private 
h .  9 power on im.  The Kremlin was able to influence considera-
b l y  North Korean affairs through the Stal in-Kim relationship. 
In the prewar North Korea the Soviet influence was 
omnipresent and Pyongyang was seen as a Soviet satellit e .  
North Korean economic and military re liance upon the USSR gave 
the Kremlin powerful levers of control . In December 1948 , 
the Rus sian occupa tion troops were wi thdrawn by the request 
of the DPRK. However , the Soviet-Koreans were keeping major 
posit ions , the Soviet mili tary advisers remained behind, and 
Rus sian political advi sers continued to dictate policy deci-
sions . In the field o f  economy, the DPRK launched its econo-
mic planning , one-year plans in 1 9 4 7  and 1948 and a Two-Year 
Plan for the years o f  1949-1950, with Soviet technical advi s -
1 0  ers . During the 1 9 46-1950 period, Soviet aid t o  North Ko-
8Robert A. Scalapino (ed.),  North Korea Today (New York : Prager 
Publishers , 1963 ) ,  p .  16 . 
9Robert A. Scalapino and Cho ng-sik Lee, �· cit . ,  p .  382 . 
10 Joseph Sang-hoon Chung, The North Korean Economy : Structure 
and Development (Stanford, Califo�: Hoover Inst itut ion Press, 1974), 
pp. 163-64. 
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rea, 1 1  including both loans and grants, totalled $546,000, 000. 
The Russian economic exploitation and cultural influ-
ence through education in order to Russianize the North were 
. . 1 . .f. 12 increasing y signi icant. Stalin and Kim Il-sung reached in 
March 1949 an agreement requiring the DPRK to accept Soviet 
political and economic forms, and a formal agreement on mu­
tual economic and cultural cooperation. 13 
Not only North Korean industry but also the army re-
lied heavily upon the Soviet support. In 1948 and 1949, the 
North was moving toward military mobilization. The preoccupa-
. 
tion of the Soviet leadership with security was matched by the 
concern of the Kim Il-sung leadership for national security. 
Stalin's main concern was the defense of the Asian front by a 
friendly pro-Soviet North Korean regime. For advanced mili-
tary training, about 10,000 North Koreans had been sent to 
Siberia. Large quantities of Soviet military equipment had 
been pouring into North Korea during the spring of 1950. The 
11 Joungwon A. Kim, Divided Korea : The Politics of Developnent, 
1945-72 (Cambridge : Havard University Press, 1976), p. 172:" 
1�orth Korea was being integrated into the Soviet econany. The 
Soviet Union was importing from the DPRK its basic raw materials and me­
tals for prices far below the nonnal world market value, and exporting 
goods to the North at prices far above the world market prices. Kim Il­
sung rruch later charged tvbscow with the econanic imperialism. Ibid., p. 
388, citing Nodong Shimun (September 7, 1964); U.S. Departmentof State, 
North Korea : A Gase Stiify in the Techniques of Takeover (Washington, D. 
C. : U.S. GOver 1n1 ent Printing Uffice, 1961) , pp. 105-9. 
13 Joseph Sang-hoon Chung, �· cit., pp. 117-18; U.S. Department 
of State, �· cit., pp. 109-113. 
10 
Kremlin supplied the DPRK with heavy guns and tanks in April 
and May of 1950. 14 It is hard to argue that Kim initiated 
the war against South Korea in June 1950, without the appro-
val and support of Stalin. 
14Joungwon A. Kim,�· cit. , pp. 172-74. 
11 
China and Pre-War North Korea 
Because of internal situation in China where a civil 
war had been in progress and the Soviet dominant control over 
the North, communist Chinese political or even cultural influ-
ence was recessive prior to the Korean War, although some per-
sisted. In 1 947, the Communist Party o� China headquarters 
in Manchuria and the Soviet-North Korean regime in Pyongyang 
began their economic and quasi-diplomatic relations. A joint 
military headquarters was formed at Pyongyang in the spring 
15 of 1 94 8 on which the CPC was represented. On October 5, 
1949,  North Korea recognized China and on October 6, the Peo­
ple's Republic of China reciprocated. Until the summer of 
1950, there was no official Chinese diplomatic mission in 
16 Pyongyang. 
Although Stalin's support led Kim to rise to power, 
the Soviets dominated the North, and efforts were being made 
to eliminate Chinese culture, North Korea remained culturally 
and politically orientated toward China. The two countries 
shared the factor of race and the historically closer ties. 
After liberation, copies of Mao's works circulated widely in 
Korea. There were close ideological similarities between Kim 
and Mao Tse-tung. For instance, Kim, like Mao, believed in 
15Kiwon Chung, '"Ihe North Korean People's Army and the Party," 
'lbe China Quarterly, no. 14 (April-June 1963) ,  p. 109. 
16Robert R. Si.moons, �· cit., p. 152. 
' 
l 
1 2  
policies of the "united front." Having personal experience 
with the Chinese Communists during the 1 9 30s and academic 
training in Chinese schools, Kim felt close to the Chinese 
ideologically. 
China and North Korea failed to establish formal di-
plomatic relations and to sign formal and public treaties. 
It was said, however, that they had concluded a mutual as­
sistance pact in 1946, and a bilateral defense treaty in Mos-
cow in March 1949, under the watchful eye of Stalin, which 
gave China an opportunity to maintain its interest in the 
North.17 
During the winter of 1949-1 950, the CPC began to 
transfer two divisions in Manchuria - about 40,000 troops -
of the former Korean Volunteer Army to North Korean control, 
Chinese forces continued to move to Manchuria, and also the 
Soviet military equipment flowed to North Korea through Man­
churia . 1 8  These developments indicated at least Chinese ad­
vance knowledge of the war, although there was no clear evi-
dence of Chinese participation in the planning and prepara-
tion of the Korean War. As the United States, after occupy-
17 Ibid. , pp. 31-33; Joungwon A. Kim, .£1?.· cit., p. 174. 
18North Korea : A Cotmtry Sb..rly (Washington, D.C. : The American 
University, 1981) ,  p. 2 2 ;"1.J.s. Department of State, op. cit. , p. 117; 
Harold C. Hinton, ColTITIUilist China in World Politics "IB'oston : Houghton 
Mifflin Company, 1966), p. 211. -
1 3  
ing Japan, began to hint that the United States might have 
to rearm Japan, Korea's importance to Beijing's security was 
enhanced because of its closeness to China and Japan and Mao 
succeeded in per suading Stalin to give him the Sino-Soviet 
alliance signed on February 14, 1 950. 19 
land 
19Young-c Kim, ed., Major Powers and Korea ( Silver Spring, Mary­
Research Institute on Korean Affairs, 1973), p. 15. 
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The Korean War 
Sino-Soviet Involvement and Contribution 
It was the Chinese People's Volunteers in the Korean 
War that ensured the survival of North Korea, while the Soviet 
Union was responsible for the establishment of the DPRK and 
its early development. The USSR demonstrated its unwilling-
ness to risk a war with the United States. From the Korean 
War China learned that Korea possessed the route to invade 
her industrial heartland Manchuria, and that the Soviets were 
unreliable. The North Koreans felt the Soviet undependabili­
ty, and their gratitude to the Chinese. The Soviet Union 
could at best be counted upon only for military hardware and 
some advisers. 
All three of the communist countries concluded that 
the United States would not fight to protect South Korea. 
Thus unification seemed highly desirable to China and the 
Soviet Union. With cautious confidence to win a victory in 
Korea, Stalin allowed the war to start. One of his purposes 
was to assuage his pride over the f ailure of the Berlin block-
ade and the formation of NATO. It was quite possible that 
Stalin planned his Northeast Asia and Mao's Southeast Asia.20 
On June 2 5 ,  1950, North Korea attacked South Korea. 
20Harold C. Hinton, China's Turbulent Quest : Im Anal�sis of 
China's Foreign Relations since 1945 (New York : Macmilian, 19 0), pp. 
42=43. 
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The North Korean troops nearly reached the tip of the South 
before the involvement of United Nations forces in the war. 
By October, the North Korean armed forces had been driven 
back up toward the Yalu River which provides part of the Sino-
North Korean border. Three-way negotiations between Pyong­
yang, Moscow and Beijing were opened by the Soviet Union to 
bring the Chinese into the battle, and resulted in the inter-
vention of the CPV in the fighting in support of North Korea 
on October 25. 
After the assurance of adequate military aid from 
Moscow, China had reluctantly entered into the war largely in 
order to defend its territory against the United States, ra-
ther than to save the North Korean regime, a fact that Pyong-
yang well understood. The decision to intervene was probably 
made by Mao Tse-tung and a minority of the Chinese leadership. 
The PRC wanted a friendly North Korean regime with similar po-
litical ideologies. The Manchurian industry needed the North 
Korean cooperation in the transmission of electric power from 
Supung Dam to Manchuria. 2 1  China did have neither full self-
2 2  assertive confidence nor expansionist goals. Beijing prob-
ably calculated that its intervention in the war would 
strengthen its influence in North Korea. But Chinese lever-
21u. s. Department of State, �· cit. , pp. 116-17. 
22 Allen S. Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu (Stanford, California 
Stanford University Press, 1960), p. 159.- --
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age was reduced by Chinese defeats beginning early in 1951, 
which made Beijing anxious to avoid another direct military 
confrontation with America. 23 
During the war, Chinese battle casualities totalled 
9 0,000, over one-third of the total Chinese strength, and to 
finance the Korean War Beijing borrowed at least $2 ,000 mil­
lion from Moscow. 24 Prior to 1956, the PRC had borrowed 
2 5  $430 million in addition to the $2 billion to finance the war. 
The Korean War, however, provided China with an opportunity 
to pursue its relations with the Soviet Union on a sounder 
basis, which was unwished for but finally to China's advan-
tage. 
The USSR sought not to escalate the war to avoid di- . 
rect clash with the United States in view of American strate-
gic superiority, through its diplomacy and a policy of arms 
limitation. Soviet military aid to China was noticeably weak 
until the military stalemate in the summer of 1951. It was 
only after the stalemate that the Soviets began to build up 
the Chinese Volunteer's military strength to the extent com­
parable with that of the United Nations forces. Moscow 
23young-c Kim, ed. ,  �· cit., p. 17. 
24au.nese strength was estimated at 300,000. see Matthew B. 
Ridgway, The Korean War (New York : IX>ubleday, 1967), p. 150. 
25see Calvin Sue Ken Chin, A Study of Chinese De�ndency � 
the Soviet Union for Economic Develo�nt as a Factor in �IT11lllnist 
"C'fifna's Foreign POII'cy (HOrig Kong :� t:JniOn�esearch�nstitute, 1959) , 
pp. 49-70. 
17 
sought to ensure after the ceasefire the Chinese and North 
Korean forces defendable against possible American counter-
ff . 2 6  o ensive. 
In sum, the Chinese relied largely either on pre-Ko-
rean War weapons or on American arms captured on Asian bat-
tle fields. The type of arms supplied by the Soviets to the 
Chinese and the North Koreans made more clear the potential 
for strain between the three comminist regimes . Much of the 
heaviest Soviet military material was not sent to the commu-
nist forces in Korea during the war. The Chinese awareness 
ot deficient Soviet support during the war was a contribut­
ing element to the Sino-Soviet conflict. 27 
The Panmunjom talks began on July 10 , 1951, by the 
Russian call for an armistice conference, and a ceasefire 
was reached on July 27, 1953. It was argued that Stalin, 
with basically distrustful attitude toward Beijing, dragged 
on the negotiations by pressure on China and North Korea to 
benefit through keeping Beijing and Washington tied up in Ko­
rea, and that his death in March 1953 allowed Chinese conces-
sions on the prisoner-of-war issue and thus the signing of 
2 8  the truce. Stalin's death might have led to the armistice 
26Jolm Gittings, The World arrl China, 1922-1972 (New York Har­
per arrl Row, Publishers, 1974T, pp. 1'84=85. 
27Robert R. Sirmons, �· cit. , pp. 180-82. 
28Ibid., pp. 207-208. The war continued China's dependence on the 
USSR and reC'lliCed Beijing's options toward the West, while tying down much 
of the US strength, which could otherwise have been allocated to NATO. 
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by easing the flow of Soviet aid to China, as his successors 
concentrated on factional infighting at home. It was clear 
that the Chinese had long wanted a peaceful Korean solution, 
to be followed by a settlement in Taiwan.29 
During the first year of the Panmunjom talks, the 
strains between North Korea and the Soviet Union were no-
ticeable by a series of events causing further grounds for. 
Pyongyang's dissatisfaction with the direction and support 
30 supplied by Moscow. Evidence suggests that the North Ko-
reans wer� not always in harmony with the Chinese, and it is 
resonable to assume that the differences were rarely solved 
in favor of North Korea. The purge of Ho Ka-i, a foremost 
Soviet-Korean, and G eneral Mu Chong, a leader of the Yenan 
faction, by Kim Il-sung to consolidate his power indicated 
Kim's growing realization that North Korean interests were 
not identical with those of either China or the Soviet Union. 
Thus, one outstanding characteristic of Kim's postwar poli-
cies was the emphasis on national independence. 
The war brought an estimated damage of $3,000 million 
to North Korea. It destroyed more than 8,700 industrial 
plants, damaged some 906,500 acres of arable land, and demol-
ished 6 00,000 homes, 5,000 schools, 1,000 hospitals (or cli-
The war al·so contributed to some amotmt of disarray in the Western Alli-
ance. 
29John Gittings,�· cit., pp. 187-93. 
30Robert R. Sirmons , �. cit. , pp. 208-15. 
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nics), and 260 theaters. 3 1  1.13 million North Koreans, nearly 
12 persent of the 1949 population, were lost due to actual 
war deaths or defections to the South. The industrial out-
put of 19 53 reached 64 percent of the 1949 level and consumer 
goods production less than 10 percent, while the agr�cultural 
32 output decreased by 69 percent. North Korea found itself 
after the war more relied on economic aid from both the Soviet 
Union and China than it was in the pre-war period. 
The intervention of the C P V  which prevented a total 
collapse of North Korea drastically changed the Chinese role 
in the North. The Chinese presence served for Pyongyang to 
neutralize the Soviet influence in the D PRK. The Korean War 
contributed to the increasing North Korean and Chinese com-
mon interests. Because of the high cost of the war, exten-
sive economic rehabilitation was needed in both countries. 
The Soviet assistance to China and North Korea was restric-
tive and the terms were less favorable than those offered to 
th t . 33 o er coun ries. 
However, the U S SR was still the major military and 
economic source for North Korea. There also remained a close 
Stalin-Kim relationship. The Chinese influence in the North, 
thus, was limited. Wayne S. Kiyosaki points out three basic 
31Byung-chul Koh, The Foreign Policy of North Korea (New York : 
Frederick A. Praeger, 1969):-p. 18. 
3�nn-sup Shinn, Area Hand.book for North Korea (Washington, D. 
C. : U.S. Government Printing Office, 197� p. 33. 
33wayne S. Kiyosaki, North Korea's Foreign Relations The Poli-
2 0  
factors favored Stalin; 1 )  Stal in's support for North Korea's 
revolution and its birth, 2) no marked influence of Maoism, 
and 3) Kim's belief in Stalinism. 34 
tics of Accormndation, 1945-75 (New York Praeger Publishers, 1976), pp. 
"38-40-. 
34rbid., p. 43; According to one definition of Stalinism, Stali­
nism is the'"""'"tlleory and practice of Stalin's near-totalitarian rule in the 
Soviet Union, the satellite states of Eastern Europe, and in the world 
c.onm...mist rrovarent ." For a m:xlified definition, see Boris Souvarine, 
"Stalinism," in Marxism in the Modem World, ed: Milorad M. Drachkovitch 
(Stanford: Stanrorauru.versity Press, 1965), pp. 90-107. 
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C H A P TE R  II 
N O R T H  K O R E A  IN K HR U S H C HEV ' S  R U S S I A  
The death of Stalin suddenly brought about the change 
in the attitudes and policies of policymakers in the three 
communist countries. With the Stalin's decease, Mao began to 
regard himself as the leader in the Communist world and take 
independent actions in foreign policy, which led to the Sino­
Soviet confrontation.35 Prior to the Korean War, the Soviet 
policymakers viewed Korea as essential to their world strate-
gies and thus were interested in maintaining their control 
over the North Korean regime. The Stalin's death facilitated 
a new orientation in Russian foreign policy caused largely by 
the fierce resistance of the United States against Communist 
expansionism. Soviet attention was increasingly diverted from 
countries like Korea and Vietnam toward nations recently in-
dependent or on the verge of independence. On the other hand, 
the Chinese leadership was beginning to pay more attention to 
35see Harald C. Hinton, Three and a Half Powers (Bloomington : 
Indiana University Press, 1975), pp. 70=74;-J'Oliil"Sparuer, U.S. Foreign 
Policy since World War I I  (New York : Praeger, 1973),pp. 2I9=2'1; For the origins of the Sin�oviet dispute, see Donald S. Zagoria, '' Strains 
in the Sino-Soviet Alliance," Problems of Corrmunism, vol. 9, no. 3 (ma.y-
Jlllle 1960), pp. 1-11. -
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Korea, having lessons from the Korean War. 
Nikita S. Khrushchev showed more Stalinist and more 
militant views on domestic and foreign policies than his chief 
rival, Malenkov, to gain Chinese support for his position in 
1954. With his rise to power in 1955- 57, however, Khrushchev 
began to trouble both China and North Korea by moderating his 
views and resembling those of his defeated rival. He put less 
value on China and North Korea and directed his attention to-
ward relatively remote non-Communist countries such as Egypt 
and India. At the Twentieth Congress of the C P S U in February 
1956, from which Beijing officially dates the beginning of the 
Sino- Soviet dispute, Khrushchev called for peaceful co-exist-
ence, de- Stalinization and objection to personality cults. 
His new policies endangered the political position of both 
Mao Tse-tung and Kim 11-sung, who, adopting Stalinism, pursued 
a policy of industrialization and rapid collectivization, by 
giving their comrades a lever with which to challenge their 
leadership. 36 
Kim's goal to make the North increasingly independent 
through the consolidation of national power was supported by 
the end of the special relationship between Stalin and Kim 
which allowed Stalin's influence to be carried right into the 
North Korean leadership without through normal bureaucratic 
3 'tbe 20th CP SU Congress marked the major turning point in Sino­
Soviet relations in the post- Stalin era. Beijing declared that the 20th 
Congress was the first step along the road of "revisionism." See Donald 
S. Zagoria, The Sino- Soviet Conflict (Princeton, N.J. : Princeton Univer-
,,. 
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channels. The postwar decade since Stalin's death began with 
the extreme economic dependence o f  North Korea upon Russia and 
China ; it ended with the substantial economic independence 
o f  North Korea. It began with North Korea still dominantly 
influenced by the Soviets ; it ended with North Korea siding 
with the Chinese in Beijing's criticism of Soviet policy views 
and multiplying signs of its political independence. 
Three major postwar policies of Kim Il-sung were 
1) domestic political consolidation, 2) economic reconstruc-
tion, and 3) national independence. The postwar reconsoli-
,• dation of North Korea was carried out in the presence of the 
1j Chinese forces that did not have effective control over the 
North Korean army, while the initial consolidation prior to 
1948 had been achieved with the Soviet occupation troops. 
sity Press, 1962), pp. 39-46. 
L 
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Postwar Reconsolidation 
Political Consolidation 
The Korean Conflict along with the death of Stalin 
destroyed the Soviet system of controls and provided Kim Il-
sung an excellent opportunity to consolidate his power over 
the Korean Workers' Party through purges of major party lead­
ers by placing all the blame for the North Korean defeat on 
them : Mu Chong; Ho Ka-ui; Kim Il, one of Kim 11-sung's col-
leagues; Kim Yol, the Soviet-Korean commander of the rear ar-
eas; Pak Hon-yong and Yi Sung, two of the most important 
leaders of the South Korean faction. Also, immediately after 
the armistice agreement, Kim purged the two ambassadors to 
both China and the Soviet Union, Chu Yong-ha and Kwon 0-chik, 
both of the North Korean domestic group, by blaming them for 
attempting to seek foreign intervention against the Kim 11-
sung leadership. 37 
Stalin had well understood the task of political con-
solidation, but his successors no longer perceived the need 
for building new social bases since for them the revolution 
was done and the system established. At the Third Workers' 
Party Congress of North Korea in April 1956, C P SU secretariat 
Brezhnev called for the establishment of collective leader-
37 Joungwon A. Kim, �· cit., pp. 176-82. 
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ship in the KWP and the modification of North Korean economic 
h . . 1 3 8  programs to put more emp asis on agricu ture. 
In Argust 1956 , the first and only serious challenge 
to Kim Il-sung emerged. Encouraged by Brezhnev's speech, the 
leading actors, Choe Chang-ik of the Yenan fact ion and Pak 
Chang-ok of the Soviet-Korean faction, bitterly criticized 
Kim Il-sung for his cult of personality , his authoritarian 
one-man leadership, and h i s  principal emphasis on heavy in-
dustry neglecting the improvement of living standards, and 
tried to organize an anti-Kim revolt which resulted in fail­
ure as Kim's supporters outnumbered his critics.3 9  Kim Il-
sung retaliated by purging major anti-Kim leaders , but its 
·t d t d b  th s· s · t d. t· 40 severi y was mo era e y e ino- ovie me ia ion. 
After 1956, there was a noticeable departure of Rus-
sians -except for technicians and military advisers - and So-
viet-Koreans from the North. By early 1958, Kim had secured 
a position of the invincible leader of the KWP through the 
elimination of the Soviet-Korean and Yenan-Korean influences 
' 
b t k. d f t. l" . 41 y a ing a vantage o na iona ist sentiments. 
38Joungwon A. Kim, "North Korea's New Offensive," Foreign Affairs, 
vol. 48, no. 1 (October 1969), p. 171. 
3 9Rinn-sup Shinn, �· cit., p. 35. 
40Byung-chul Koh, �· cit., p. 15; Chinese and Soviet advice 
not to treat the August incIOent severely was not completely by the KWP 
and a few of those eliminated were readmitted to the KWP, but not to for­
mer positions. Kim Il-sung indicated the Sov iet leadership's responsibi­
lity for the crisis. Joungwon A. Kim, "Soviet Policy in North Korea," 
World Politics, vol. 22, no. 2 (January 1970), p. 248. 
41Until it was purged around 1956, the Soviet faction played an 
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I n  order to build his strong internal power base, Kim 
Il-sung expanded the size of the KWP and the bureaucracy , a­
long with the collectivization of agriculture. Bet ween 1953 
and 1956, the number of employees of the regime increased 
from 8. 5 percent of the w orking population to 1 3 .6 percent. 
The KWP grew from 3 6 0,000 members in 1946 t o  1 , 3 1 0 , 000 in 1961, 
12 t f th N th K 1 t .  4 2  percen o e or orean popu a ion. In 1 9 6 3 ,  North 
Korea was placed at or near the top of the world ' s  Communist 
nations in terms of the percentage of the population in the 
Party : the membership was over 1 , 6 00 , 000 and the population 
4 3  was 1 1 , 568,000. 
Purges lasted until 1 96 1 ;  and by then a total of 75 
members were dropped from the 114 -member Central Committee of 
the KWP.4 4  F inally the Kapsan group led by Kim Il-sung in 
1 9 6 1  emerged as the leaders of Communism , advocating pure 
Marxism-Leninism against revisionism and self-reliance as the 
supreme national virtue. By the time the leadership confer-
ence of the KWP was held in Pyongyang in October, 1 9 66 , the 
overw helming majority of key party positions went to members 
important role in North Korean politics, having the support of Russia. 
For the identity, background, roles and fates of the Soviet-Koreans, see 
Chong-sik Lee and Ki-won Oh, "The Russian Faction in North Korea," Asian 
Survey, vol. 8, no. 4 (April 1968), pp. 270-88; Il-pyong J. Kim, ''The Ju­
dicial arrl administrative Stn.icture in North Korea," The China Q.Jarterly, 
no . 14 (April-June 1963 ), p. 103. 
-
42Glenn D .  Paige arrl Dong-jun Lee, ''The Post-War Politics of Ko­
rean c.amurusm," The China Q.Jarterly, no . 14 (April-June 1963), p. 17. 
43Chong-sik Lee, "Stalinisrn in the East," in The Ccmnunist Revo­
lution in Asia, ed. by Robert A. Scalapino (New York :rrentice, 1966), 
p. 123 .-;;;-
Il-pyong J. Kim, ' North Korea 's Fourth Party Congress," Paci-
. 45 of the Kim I l -sung group . 
fie Affairs , vol. 35 , no. 1 (Spring 1962 ) ,  p. 40. 
2 7  
45Byung-chul Koh, QQ.· cit . ,  p .  16 , citing Nodong Shinrrun, Octo­
ber 13, 1966, and Da.e-sook "Slih ,""Tfl!he Elite Group of North Korea" paper 
read at the anrrual conference of the Association for Asian Studies ,  Chica­
go, Ill . ,  March 20-22, 1967. 
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Economic Reconstruction 
North Korea ' s  economic development and its  substan-
tial political independence in the pos twar decade formed a 
mutually influencing relationshi p ,  and were related to other 
internal and external changes in the ten years . The economic 
growth of North Korea , which was motivated by desires for 
greater autonomy , was initially made poss ible by the Soviet 
Union, China , and other nations in the Communist bloc . 
The socia l i s t  development of the North took place in 
three stages : a three-year plan ( 1 954-56 ) for pos twar econo-
mic reconstruction ; a five-year plan ( 1957-6 1 )  for industrial 
development ; and a s even-year plan ( 1961-6 7 )  for industrial 
consolidation and expansion. Two major policies in the Three­
Year Plan were the primary emphas i s  on the development of 
heavy industry by foreign aid and the coll ectivization of 
. 1 46 agricu ture . The Five-Year Plan sought to lay the bas i s  
for a social i s t  economy t o  e s tabl ish the foundation for an 
independent economy. The Seven-Year Plan was to consolidate 
47 the basis of an independent national economy. 
The proportion of peasants in the population declined 
from 66 . 4  percent in 1 9 5 3  to 44 . 4  percent in 1 9 6 0 .  In other 
words , there was a shift of approximately 20 percent from 
4�oi.mgwon A. Kim, Divided Korea, p. 22. 
�7Joungwon A. Kim, "Soviet Policy in North Korea, "  p. 249. 
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farmers t o  workers and office employees . By Augus t  1 9 5 8 ,  the 
entire peasant s in North Korea were collectivized and thus 
the socia l i s t  economy had been fully adpoted by the country , 
which meant complete reorganization of the local bases of pow­
e r .  48 This collectivization of agriculture was facili tated 
by the presence of the Chines e  Peopl e ' s  Liberation Army . The 
3 00 , 000 Chinese Volunteers provided the badly needed manpower 
for the pos twar reconstruction. They had repaired all the 
demolished rai lway and 1 , 300 bridge s ,  and reconstructed big 
citi e s .
49 
Industrial development contributed to the decreasing 
reliance of foreign aid and changes in the foreign trade pat­
tern s .  North Korea ' s  budgetary revenue in 1954-58 came main-
ly from the state and from Socia l i s t  enterpri ses , while i t s  
revenue from foreign aid rec eived had been gradually declin-
ing since 1954,  from 3 3 . 4  percent in 1 9 54 to 4 . 5  percent in 
1958 and to 2 . 6  percent in 1 9 6 0 ,  with Pyongyang moving toward 
being self-supporting . so North Korea ' s  trade with China rose 
48Chong-sik Lee, "Land Reform, Collectivisation and the Peasants 
in North Korea ," 1he China Quarterly, no . 14 (April-June 1963 ) ,  pp. 75-76. 
49Roy u.T. Kim, "Sino-North Korean Relations ," Asian Survey, 
vol . 8 ,  no. 8 (August 1968 ) ,  p. 715. 
SOYoon T. Kuark, "North Korea ' s  Industrial Develoµnent During 
the Post-War Period," 1he China Quarterly, no . 14 (April-June 1963) ,  p .  5 .  
General State Revenue of North Korea 
Revenue from State Co­
operative Enterprises 
Foreign Aid 
1954(10) 195�'7o) 1956(10) - -- --
52.9 69 . 1  74.7 
33.4 21.  7 16 . 5  
1957(%) 
82 . 2  
12 . 2  
1958(%} 
92 . S  
4 . 5  
3 0  
from 9 percent in 1 955 to about 27 percent in 1957 , while 
that with the Soviet Union declined from about 9 0  percent to 
51 57 percent. Since 1 9 6 1 , trade with Japan had greatly in-
creased. North Korea by 1 962 had governmental trade rela-
tions with such free w orld countries as Egypt , Iraq and Aus-
t . 52 ria. 
The economic assistance by Mosco w and Beijing contri-
buted greatly to P yongyang's economic reconstruction. The 
U S S R  in the post w ar decade provided at least 2 , 000 million 
rubles in grants and credits, the services of 1 ,500 techni-
cians , and advice , technical documentation and equipment for 
about 40 industrial enterprises. The aid in grants and ere-
<lits which North Korea received from China w as estimated at 
1 , 820 million rubles in 19 6 1 .53 
China ' s  aid surpassed that of the U S S R  in the immedi-
ate postw ar period and even came from its own loan from the 
Soviet Union. In 1954-56 , P yongyang received 1 , 000 million 
Yuan ( about 1 , 320 million rubles at the official exchange 
rate ) from Beijing.54 China probably took a $200 million 
51A1exander Eckstein, Conm.mist China's Economic Growth and For-
� Trade (New York : McGraw-Hill, 1966) ,  p. 164. - -
52.niomas Perry Thornton, "Foreign Relations of the Asian Com­
rrunist Satellites, "  Pacific Affairs , vol. 35, no . tt (Winter 1962-63 ) ,  p. 
346 . 
53Far Eastern Econcxnic Review : 1962 Yearbook, p. 149 . 
5�lip Rudolph, ' North Korea and the Path to Socialism. " Paci-
fic Affairs, vol. 32, no . 2 ( June 1959 ) ,  pp. 133-34. 
--
' 1\ 
., 
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grant fo� �North Korea out of the loan it had received from 
the Soviet Union.
S S  In October 1 9 6 0 ,  at a time when the Sino-
Soviet dispute was growing , China made a $ 1 0S million loan -
its largest pos twar loan - to North Korea for the period 
1 9 6 1-64 . For the Five-Year Plan , a $250 million grant was 
provided by the USSR and $ 2 6 5  mi llion by other Ea s t  European 
countrie s .  However ,  the North Korean regime could finance 
the plan mainly by internal savings through a compul sory sav­
ings plan - Kim had to launch a mas s ive program to mobilize 
dome stic resources , in large part because of Khrushchev ' s  
criticism of the goals of the plan since the 20th CPSU Con­
gre s s  in 1 9 5 6 . 56 
The Chine s e  generous a s s i s tanc e ,  which began with 
waiver of all wartime debts and promise to train North Korean 
technicians , indicated the Chines e  view of North Korean re-
covery as extraordinarily significant and attes ted to the i-
dentification of the Chines e  national interest with the pre-
servation and stabilization of North Korea , since Beij ing it-
self badly needed resources for its  own first five-year eco-
5 7  nomic plan . 
In November 1960 , the Soviet Union announced cancel-
- SS
S��t- a�d wa� the very tn.Icleus of China ' s  Five-Year Plan( 1953-
57) .  See Calvin Sue Ken Ch.in, �· cit . ,  pp. 73-75. 
56Chong-sik Lee , "Stalinism in the F.ast,'" p .  132; Il-pyong J. 
Kim, "Changing Perspectives in North Korea : Approach to Economic Devel­
opment , "  Problems of Coom.mism, vol . 22, no. 1 (January-February 1973 ) ,  
p. 45. 
-
57 Alexander Eckstein, �· cit . ,  pp. 162-63. Chinese economic 
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lation· of repay ment by P y ongyang of one $ 1 9 0  million Russian 
loan and an agreement to defer repay ment of another $ 3 5  mi l­
lion. The Soviet Union had agreed, sometime during 1 9 5 9-6 1, 
to build an oil refinery and to provide by 1967 the crude oil 
essential for its use, which seemed to have been a:: late con-
cession to North Korean needs and an attempt to maintain a 
vital economic l ink, as North Korea was rel ied upon foreign 
oil and its refinery was destroyed in the w ar .58 
However, after 1 9 6 2  the Soviet Union cut down econo-
aid to North Korea during the years of 1953-64 , can be seen in the fol­
lowing table. 
CO'MJNIST CHINA'S ESTIMATED EXPENDIWRES FOR ECONCX1IC ASSISTANCE TO 
OIHER CCM-1lJNIST COUNIRIES, 1953-64 ( IN MIUIONS OF U.S. OOLLARS) 
:tQfil:M-e to Year tb'1li¥t�r±�s Assistance to Individual Countries 
1953 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1958 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
25.00 
Albania HUilgary N.Kor�a N.Vietnam ffirigolia 
25.00 
50.00 
104 .00 4 .00 
119.00 2.00 
139. 00 4 . 00 
103.75 5.00 
94 .00 19.00 
70. 00 5.00 
107.00 42.00 
100. 75 42.00 
99.75 41.00 
58.75 
7.50 
25.00 
25.00 
50.00 
50.00 
50.00 
50.00 
7.50 
8.75 
8.75 
26.25 
26.25 
26.25 
26.25 
50. 00 
50.00 
50.00 
50.00 
50.00 
50.00 
22.50 
22.50 
22.50 
22.50 
10.00 
10.00 
16.25 
16.25 
6.25 
16.25 
10.00 
10. 00 
10. 00 
a 'lllis aid represents last installment of China 's grants 
during the Korean War. 
Note : - stands for ''none''. 
58Glerm D. Paige, The Korean People's Democratic Re�lic (Stan­
ford : The Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, 66), pp. 
41-42. 
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mic a s s i s tance to retaliate North Korean ins i s tence on the 
policy of independent economy and Pyongyang ' s  alignment with 
the Chinese in the Sino-Soviet confrontation. Up to that 
time , 48. 8 percent of the total economic aid the DPRK had re-
ceived had come from Moscow, 30. 9 percent from Bei j ing , and 
the remainder from Eastern Europe . Soviet economic and mili­
tary aid was resumed in 19 65.59 
59 Joungwon A. Kim, "Soviet Policy in North Korea , "  p. 249. 
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North Korean Neutra l i sm prior to 1 9 6 2  
The Chines e  pos ition i n  the international Communi s t  
movement was greatly s trengthened a s  the result of Stalin ' s  
death and its  influence in North Korea was growing after the 
CPVs · intervention in the Korean War ,  whil e  the USSR suffered 
from the war i t s  worst expectations . The primacy of Soviet 
leverage appeared to have remained by the time North Korea 
fol lowed the Chine s e  agricultural commune s  in late 1958. Un­
til 1 958, Pyongyang fol lowed the Soviet Union ' s  economic sys-
tern more closely than that of China . This North Korean reli-
ance of Soviet models and Rus sian experiences for its  own e-
conomic reconstruction plans reflected the level of Soviet 
. f 1 
6 0  
in uence . Up until 1 9 6 1, the KWP continued to acknowledge 
the Soviet leadership in the international Communist movement . 
From 1958 to 1 9 6 1 ,  there were , however ,  increasing signs of 
North Korean imitation of Chines e  polici e s ,  while the KWP 
tried to maintain neutral course . Since the 1 9 6 1  Twenty-Se-
cond CPSU Congre s s  the KWP had moved toward China and became 
the CPC ' s  ally in a wi<le range of i s sues in the Communi s t  
movement . 
The Chines e  involvement and the voluntary service of 
the CPVs during their stay of seven years and three months , 
60'Ihe North Korean program of industrial develoµnent was a modi­
fied version of the industrialization policy of the CPSU under Stalin, 
which called for the priority development of heavy industry together with 
the simultaneous develoµnent of light industry and agriculture. 
3 5  
along with the Chinese extensive economic a s s i s tanc e ,  made 
Pyongyang increasingly responsive to Bei j ing . From 1 9 5 1  to 
1 9 5 8 ,  Kim 1 1-sung could withdraw from the Soviet control 
through three policies : purging the Soviet -Koreans , con s o l i -
dating his dome s t i c  power bas e ,  and trying t o  construct an in-
dependent economy and armed force s .  The Soviet Union opposed 
to these policies , and attempted to restore its control over 
North Korea ; it failed to do s o .  The Five-Year Plan was drawn 
up without Soviet a s s i s tance or approval . The Seven-Year Plan 
was a ls o against Soviet "cooperative planning" among the 
countries of: the Communi st bloc . The presence of the Chinese 
troops in the North was influential in allowing Kim to defy 
Soviet controls . In other words , the CPVs served a decrease 
o f the Soviet control over the KWP - unlike the Soviets in the 
late 1940s , the Chinese troops did not attempt to gain direct 
control over North Korea but sought for long-term goodwi l l . 
The close equality of the Chinese and the Soviet a s s i s tance , 
and North Korea ' s  s i gnificant economic gains during the post­
war period paved the way for Kim ' s  e s t abli shment of Juche idea 
( sel f-identity or s e l f-relianc e )  in the 1 9 6 0 s . 
As the growing Sino-Soviet conflict forced North Ko-
rea to choose between the two communi s t  powers , the North Ko­
rean regime found i t s e l f  in a serious dil emma . 6 1  Pyongyang 
610n the differences between Khrushchev and Mao Tse-tung, see 
Vidya Prakash futt , China and the World An Analysis of Coom.mist China ' s  
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could not afford to alienate either : the KWP o w e d  to · the 
CPSU its birth , while it o w e d  to the PRC its survival , as 
noted earlier , and in spite of its successful achievement of 
an independ ent economy , the assistance of both China and the 
Soviet Union was vital to the d evelopment of its scientifi c ,  
military , and industrial facilitie s .  The North Korean re-
gime ' s  initial reaction was the cautious policy of neutralism 
or nonalignment : an obscure position on such issues as peace-
ful co-existance ,  d e-S talinization and the commune s .  
Beijing d enounced Soviet d e- Stalinization immdeiately 
after Khrushchev ' s  speech in 19 S6. Py ongyang adhered to So-
viet collective lead ership principle , but d i d  not mention 
S t alin's name for some years to satisfy Beijing by avoiding 
personal attack on S t alin. 62 At the Moscow Conference in 
1 9 S7 Kim Il-sung kept silent on any controversial issue. Kim 
called for the unity of the international Communist Movement ,  
and faithfully recognized the Soviet Union as the leader of 
the Socialist bloc , but stressed the equal intra-bloc rela­
tionship. 6 3  After the conference , the Py ongyang regime em-
Foreign Policy (New York : Praeger, 1966 ) ,  pp. 62-146. See also David 
Ftoyed, Mao against Khrushchev : A Short History of the Sino-Soviet Con­
flict (�aeger, 1963 )  ;- William E. Griffitll," 'Iti"eSino-Sovief 
Rift (Cambridge : The M . I .T. Press, 1964) ; London says,  TTfierirst phase 
O'F"'the Russian-Chinese separation took place after 19S3. The second phase,  
that of ideological polimics , which began in 19S6, ended in early 1960, 
Yben the quarrel came into the open. Fran 1960 to 1964, the war of words 
continued unabatedly . "  Kurt L. London, "'Ihe Sino-Soviet Conflict Tcx:lay ," 
Current History, vol. SS, no . 32S ( September 1968 ) ,  pp. 1S9. 
62Philip Rudolph, op. cit., p. 33.  
63Philip Rudolph, "North Korea and the Path to Socialism," Paci­
fic Affairs , vol. 32 , no. 2 (Jt.me 19S9 ) ,  p. 142. 
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phas i zed more vigorously the campaign for Juche . 
In 1 9 5 8 , while North Korea strove to develop heavy 
industry under a radical economic program, the Five-Year Plan 
( 1 9 5 7- 6 1 ) ,  the CPC launched the policies of Great Leap Forward 
and the people ' s  commune for rapid economic and social <level-
opment , which in�roduced an el ement of di scord to Sino-Soviet­
North Korean relations . 64 Unlike Soviet negative reac t i on ,  
North Korea praised the Chinese attemp t .  Pyongyang ' s  agricul-
tural collectivizat ion program and the Chollima Undong ( Fl y-
ing Horse Movement ) ,  which were inaugurated in September 1 9 5 8 , 
fol lowed clos ely the Chine se programs , both in timing and me­
thods . 65 The Kim Il -sung leadership praised the Chinese com-
64R • .  L. Walker, "The Development of Chinese Coom.mist Foreign 
Policies in Asia , "  in Economic and Social Problems of the Far East, ed. 
E. F. Szcsepanik (Hbng Kong : H�versity PresS,-1%'2")-;-P- 281 � 
Also see Chu-yuan Cheng, Cormuni.st China ' s  Economy, 1949-1962 : Structu­
ral Changes and Crisis ( South orange, New Jersey : Seton-Ha!T, 1963 ) ,  p.  
38 ; This distinctive Chinese road to Socialism and Comrunism diverged 
sharply from Soviet experience� See Edgar Snow, The Other Side of the Riv­
er : Red China Today (New York : Random House, Inc . ,  1961) , pp. T72-84; 
Hao probably asked for massive Soviet economic aid in November 1957 . 
When Mao ' s  request was rejected, the Chinese leadership started revolu­
tionary expedient , the Great Leap Forward. o. F.dmund Clubb, "China ' s  Po­
sition in Asia," in International Politics of Asia : Readings, ed. 
George P.  Jan (Belm:mt, talifonua : Wadsworffi PU6Tishlng CO. , Inc . , 
1969 ) ,  p. 164. 
65"Revolution on the Establishment of People ' s  Corrmunist in the 
Rural Areas , "  Beijing Review, September 16, 1958 , pp. 21-23; John Brad­
bury, "Sino-So�tition in North Korea, "  The China Q.Jarterly, no . 
6 (April-Jtme 1961 ) ,  p .  17 . The Flying Horse t-bvement aimed at rapid e­
conomic develoµnent through intensive human labour. 
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munes , and in October 195 8, moved toward larger cooperative �? 
Khru sachev attacked Beijing 's G r eat Leap Forward and commune 
polic ies.6 7  Thus, Pyongyang tried to avoid either a complete 
rejection of the Soviet experience or an emulation of the Chi-
6 8  nese. 
North Korea ' s  experimentati on with the Chinese poli-
cies did not take place under Chinese dictation. It began at 
a time when B eijing's influence was considerably reduced : by 
195 8, as already mentioned, the Yenan leaders were completely 
purged, and the Ch inese troops were withdrawn from North Ko-
rea according to the Sino-North Korean joint communi qu e signed 
6 9  in February, 195 8. T h e  North Korean leaders probably ini-
tiated the re quest for the complete evacuation of foreign 
troops from Korea, with the understanding of Moscow. The So­
viet Union fully s upported the joint communi que. 7 0  
The K W P  began to adopt new styles of leadership 
which stressed the Chongsanri spirit and t he ' Taean Electrical 
7 1  Works system. The Chongsanri spirit issued in 1960 was i-
66 Chong-sik Lee, "'Ihe ' Socialist Revolution ' in the North Ko­
rean Countryside," Asian Survey, vol. 11, no . 8 (October 1962 ), p. 22. 
6 7 John Bradbury, '' Sino- Foviet Competition in North Korea,'  
op. cit., pp. 21-22. 
6 8For instance, North Korea retained the tenn "cooperative" 
instead of "coomune" to avoid outraging the Soviets. 
69c1enn D. Paige, ' North Korea and the Emulation of Russian 
and Chinese Behavior," in A. Doak Barnett, ed. , Cormn.mist Strategies in 
Asia (New York : Praeger, 1963), pp. 242-43. 
70 Bytmg-chul Koh, �· cit., pp. 53-54. 
7 1Tue Chongsanri spirit was to i.rrprove work methods, emphsiz-
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dentical with t he Chinese Hsia-fang (i. e . ,  downwar d )  move­
ment launched in 1957 . 7
2 The Taean E lectrical Works syst em 
also reflected Chinese experience : the Chinese announced at 
the E ight P art y Congress of t he Chinese Communist Party in 
19 5 6 . 7 3 The main reason for North Korean imitation of the 
Chinese experience seemed to be the P yongyang regime ' s  con-
vict ion t hat Chinese policies would fit Nort h  Korean economic 
cond itions. 
North Korean neutrality was maintained during t he 
1958 Taiwan Strait crisis (August 2 3-Sept emver 12 ). 74 P yong-
yang carefully avoided involvement, when Moscow failed to 
give sufficient support for the Chinese intent ion to take 
over Taiwan. The official statement of P yongyang to endorse 
the Chinese statement of Sept ember 6 which expressed Beijing's 
desire to settle t he problem by peaceful means was issued on-
1 f t  M h d · d t h  ch·  7
5 y a er oscow a praise e inese announcement. 
The Chinese attack on Khrushchev's peaceful coexist-
ence line was launched in 19 58, two years aft er t he 20th CPSU 
ing the man rather than material corrli.tion. The Taean system replaced one­
man management of factories and interprises with collective leadership by 
Party Omnittees, heightening the leading role of the Party in economy and 
solving economic tasks by roobilizing the masses through political education. 
See Koon-woo Nam, The North Korean Catmmist Leadership, 1945-1965 (Alabama 
: Alabama University"Press, 1974), pp. 128-129. -- --
72see John W. Lewis, Leadershi
� 
in Corrmunist China (Ithaca, N.Y. 
: Cornell University Press, 1963), p. 8 • 
73see Franz Schunrenn, Ideology arrl Or
g
anization in Carmm.ist China 
(Berkeley : University of California Pres'5,"""""196 ) , pp. 284=85. 
740n Taiwan Strait crisis, see IX:mald S. Zagoria, �· cit., pp. 
200-221. 
75New York Times, September 9, 1958, pp. 1 and 12. 
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76 Congre s s .  North Korean divergence from i t s  emphatic sup-
port o f  Khrushchev ' s  line emerged in the f a l l  of 1 9 5 9 ,  when 
the Pyongyang regime fully backed China in the first Sino-
Indian border clash in September 1 9 5 9 , in which Moscow took 
t 1 . . d f d t t B · · · 7 7  a neu ra . position an re use o suppor e i Jing . 
But North Korea was highly in favor o f  Khrushchev ' s  
detente with the wes t .  The Sino-Soviet r i f t  over peaceful 
coexistence became more critical by the Soviet detente with 
the we s t  in 1 95 9 . 7 8  B e i j ing resented Khrushchev ' s  1 9 5 9  po-
l i cy of rapprochement and nuclear test ban and dis armament 
propo s al s ,  which led Moscow to break the S oviet agreement to 
provide atomic technical a s s i stance to Bei j ing . In contras t ,  
in September ,  1 9 5 9 ,  in return for Kirn 11- sung ' s  support o f  
Khrushchev, the Soviet Union agreed to provide North Korea 
with technical a s s i stance for atomic energy . 7 9 
The North Koreans , however ,  rejected the application 
of peaceful coexi s tence policy to North Korean-South Korean 
relations , and cont inued to attack the United States on seek-
ing a war i n  Korea . Beijing and Pyongyang shared a common 
76For Khrushchev' s  grourrl for peaceful co-existence, see Nikita 
S.  Khrushchev, ''On Peaceful c.oexi.s tence, '' Foreign Affairs , vol . 38, no. 1 
(October 1959 ) ,  pp. 1-18 ; For the reasons for the Chinese objection, see 
Ibnald S.  Zagoria, op. cit . ,  pp. 42-46 .  
77Byung-chul Koh, op. cit . ,  p .  57. 
78Most canpelling �ason for Khrushchev to seek a detente with 
the west originated from domestic strains and difficulties . See Merle 
Fainsod , "Khrushchevism," in Milorad M. Drachkovitch, ed . ,  Marxism in the 
M:xleni World (Stanford : Stanford University Press , 1965) ,  pp. 108-I1S:--
79Roy U. T. Kim, op. cit. , pp. 716-17 . 
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enmity toward the United States . 
The Treaty o f  Friendship , Co-operation and Mutual 
A s s i s tance between the DPRK and the USSR was concluded on Ju-
ly 6 ,  1 96 1 , in Moscow. On July 1 1 ,  1 9 6 1 , in Bei jing , North 
Korea and China signed a treaty of Friendship , Co-operation, 
and Mutual A s s i stanc e . 80 Both treaties empha s ized North Ko-
rea ' s  independenc e ,  territorial integrity and non-interfer-
ence in each other ' s  internal affairs , and thus the Soviet 
Union and China jointly e s tablished North Korean neutra l i s m .  
However,  a careful compar i s i on o f  the two mutual defense 
treaties revealed that the Kreml in speeches were "formal " ,  
whi le the Bei jing s tatements were "intima t e " , indicating 
Pyongyang ' s  some d i fficul ties in maintaining i t s  neutral 
stand in the intensi fying Sino-Soviet di spute . 81 
8°Far F.astern Econani.c Review : 1963 Yearbook, p. 179 ;  Beijing 
Review, Ju1�4, 1961, p. 5; Cllrrent Digest of the Soviet Press (hereafter 
CDSP), August 2, 1961, pp. 23=24. - --
8�obert A. Scalapino , '"Ihe Foreign Policy of North Korea," The 
China Q.iarterly, no. 14 (April-June 1963 ) ,  pp . 37-38 . 
-
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Sino-North Korean Alignment 
North Korea began to adopt more divergent pos i t i on 
from the Soviet line in late ·1 9 6 1 , when the Sino-Soviet s p l i t  
was further hightened by overt di scord between the Soviet Un-
ion and China over the Albanian i s sue at the Twenty-second 
Congre s s  of the CPSU in October and November 1 96 1 . The ideol-
ogical line of the Albanian Workers ' Party was much identical 
with the Chinese Communi s t  Party ' s ,  and the Albanian leaders 
consistantly backed the Chinese stance in the Sino-Soviet con-
f . 82 rontation . At the Congress of October 1 9 6 1 , Pyongyang sup-
ported nei ther the Rus s i an denunc iation nor the Chinese sup-
port of Albani a .  Ye t ,  on November 8 , 1 9 6 1 ,  on the 20th anni­
versary of the founding of the Albanian Part y ,  the KWP sent a 
positive message to the AWP praising i t s  revolutionary a-. 
chievement and stress ing the friendship and sol idarity be­
tween North Korea and Albani a . 8 3 
By late 1 9 6 2 , the Pyongyang regime had shifted clo­
ser toward the Chinese camp by unfailingly taking pro-Chi-
nese posit ion on the major confl i c t ing i s sues of the two com-
munist powers : the Yugoslavian i s sue , the . Sino-Indian di spute 
and the Cuban cri s i s .  The Soviet-Yugo s l av rapprochement was 
intensifying in the spring and summer of 1 9 6 2 , as Khrushchev 
820ne of the· main reasons for Albania ' s  successful difiance 
of Moscow was Chinese support. See William E .  Griffith, Albania and the 
Sino-Soviet Rift (Cambridge : The M . I .T. Press ,  1964) , pp . 2-3. - -
-
EJ:"'""'. Robert A. Scalapino, "The Foreign Policy of North Korea ," 
op. cit . ,  pp. 38-39. 
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steadily s ought to woo Tito , taking a considerably l e s s  anti­
Yugoslav s t ance than the Chine s e . 84 North Korea , in the fall 
o f  1 9 6 2 , continued to follow the Chine se outcry against "Yu-
goslav revisionism . "  I t  seemed that Khrushchev himself was 
under direct North Korean attack . 85 
On the i s sue o f  the massive Chine se inva s i on o f  In-
dian territory in October 1 96 2 ,  which increased China ' s  in­
fluence in the Far Eas t ,  the North Korean leadership was 
firmly behind the Chine s e . 86 The Soviet Union refused to 
take sides in the di spute . In spite of i t s  official neutral 
position, the USSR was supporting India by providing her with 
m i l i tary a i d . 8 7  The Chinese directly critici zed Soviet mili­
tary aid to India . 88 As an application of the Soviet global 
strategy to rectify i t s  adverse strategic balanc e ,  the Soviet 
Union began to emplace offens ive m i s s i l e s  in Cuba in September 
1 9 6 2 . 89 On October 2 8 , the Kremlin agreed to pull i t s  mis-
84william E. Griffith, 'llle Sino-Soviet Rift, op. cit . ,  pp. 43-
48 . One of the reasons for KhruShchev' s overtures to Trto -Wr a rappro­
chement was to use as a weapon against China . .  
85Chong-sik Lee, "Stalinism in the East , "  op. cit . ,  p .  142 .  
86Margaret W. Fisher, et al . ,  Himalayan Background : Sino-Indian 
rivalry in Radakh (New York : Praeger, 1963) , pp. 129=46; Davi""(f""Floyd, �· cit.-;-pp. 159-60. 
87Alexander Dallin, et al . ,  Diversity in International Conmunism 
: A IX:>cumentary Record , 1961-1963 (New York : COTumbia Uriiversity Press, 
190'3), pp. 659-660. 
88John W. Lewis, "Camtuni.st China ' s  Invasion of the Indian Fron­
tier : 'llle Framework of llitivation," Current Scene , vol. 2 ,  no. 7 (January 
2 ' 1963) ' p .  3 • 
89ttarry M. Pachter, Collision Course : 'llle Cuban Missile Crisis 
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s i l e s  out of Cuba . 90 B e i j ing accused Moscow of capitulatioi� 
Although North Korea did not condemn spec i fically the Soviet 
decis ion to withdraw the mi s s i le s , it took a firmly mi l l i tant 
stand on the Cuban i s sue , and renewed i t s  attack on modern 
revis ioni sm. 9 2  Khrushchev ' s  backdown in the Cuban cri s i s  
served a s  a turning point in Pyongyang ' s  relations with B e i j ­
ing and Moscow . The Soviet-North Korean relations cooled 
suddenly and the North Korean regime moved closer to China . 
Khrushchev ' s  policies in the international i s sues of 
1 9 6 2  made the Kim I l -sung leadership , which shared a view 
with the Chinese that a l l  commun i s t  countries should uni te 
into one to support a communi st country in the case of con-
f l i cting with a noncommunist nation, further d i s i l lusioned 
with the reliabi l i ty of Soviet support and protection? 3 The 
DPRK had took much pains to pursue the policy of noninvolve-
ment mainly because of i t s  need for mili tary and economic a i d  
from both the USSR and the PRC , whi l e  exerting a l l  pres sure 
arrl C.oexistence (New York : Praeger, 1963 ) ,  p. 9 ;  Graham T. Allison, Es­
sence of Decision : Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis ( Boston : Litt!e, 
Brown &co. ' 1971) PP· 43-56. -
90navid L. Larson," The Cuban Crisis of 1962 ( Boston : Houghton 
Mifflin, 1963 ) ,  pp .  161-62. -
- --
91New York Times , November 1 ,  1962, p. 1 .  
92 Byung-chul Koh, �· cit . ,  p. 66 . 
93Rirm-sup Shirm, et al . ,  �· cit . ,  p. 206 .  
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to close the gap between the two powers which would weaken 
94 their support for North Korean s tance against South Korea . 
Neutral i s m ,  however ,  became a much more difficult tactic be-
cause of the steadi ly intensifying Sino-Soviet spl i t .  The 
KWP thus consistantly sided with the Chinese at the congress 
of pro-Soviet European Commun i s t  parties held from November , 
1 9 6 2  to January , 1 9 6 3 , which brought to North Korea the open 
h · 1 ·  f th E C · t t ·  95 osti ity o e uropean ommuni s  par i e s . 
Unt i l  the fall of Khrushchev in October 1 9 6 4 ,  North 
Korea remained as Beijing ' s  most open ideological Asian a l l y .  
The North Korean regime , however , did not directly denounce 
Khrushchev or the Soviet Union, thus maintaining a moderate , 
96 rather than an extremi s t  pro-Chines e  stance . The interac-
tion between Pyongyang and Be i j ing became much more active , 
and various economic and cultural programs between them were 
exchanged . In June 1 96 3 ,  Liu Shao-chi , chairman o f  the PRC , 
and Choe Yong-kon , North Korea ' s  t i tular counterpart to Liu, 
produced a joint S ino-Korean communique on the relations be-
tween the two countries as well as among sociali st countri e s . 
94The primary task for Korean Conmunists to take over South Ko­
rea was the withdrawal of American military personnel fran the South. 
See Glenn D. Paige, ' 'Korea ," in Cyril E. Black and Thomas P. Thornton, 
eds . ,  Corml.mism and Revolution : the "Strate�ic Uses of Political Violence 
( Princeton : Princeton Uriiversityrress ,  19 4), p. 210. 
95wayne S.  Kiyosaki, ££· cit . ,  pp. 55-56 ; William E. Griffith, 
The Sino-Soviet Rift , £E_. cit. , p. -o7. 
96Williarn E. Griffith, Ibid . ,  p. 192. 
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The communique stre s s ed a struggle against "U . S .  imperia l i sm , "  
"modern revisionism" obviously directed Yugoslavia and the So-
viet Union , and equal inter-party relat ionship s . In Sep-
tember, another Sino-North Korean statement was i s sued which 
reaffirmed the views in the June communique . 9 7  
When the Soviet Union and the United States reached 
an agreement to limit nuc lear tests in July 1 96 3 ,  the DPRK, 
following the Chine s e ,  refused to s ign the nuclear tes t-ban 
treaty and attacked the treaty as an American "plot 1 1 • 9 8  Pyong-
yang claimed that all social i s t  countries should p o s s e s s  nu-
9 9  cl ear technology. However ,  there was no direct North Korean 
denounce against Khrushchev ' s  intention to prevent China from 
100 acquiring nuclear weapons . The close Sino-North Korean 
relations was highlightened in June 1 9 6 4  when the second A-
s ian Economic Seminar sponsored by China and North Korea was 
101 held in Pyongyang . At the seminar attended by the repre-
sentatives of pro-PRC delegations from 34 Afro-Asian coun­
tri e s ,  the Kim Il-sung leadership emphas ized the need for 
each nation ' s  independent national economy to achieve i t s  po-
97 Asian Recorde1:, July 39 ·- AUc_,"USt 5 ,  1963, pp. 5330-5331. 
98william E. Griffith, The Sino-Soviet Rift, op. cit . , pp. 11-12. 
99M. T. Haggard , ''North Korea ' s  International Position," Asian 
Survey, vol. 5 ,  no . 8 (August 1965 ) ,  p.  381; Far Eastern Economic Review 
: 1964 Yearbook, p.  127. 
lOO
Paul F. Langer, "Outer Mongolia, North Korea, North Viet-Nam," 
in Adam Brarike, ed., The Coom.mist States at the Crossroads Between Mos­
cow and Bei!ing (New YOrk : Praeger, 1965)-,-p:-TS3. - - 10 COSP, Senternbe� 9,  1964, pp. 16-17. 
.. 
:,1 
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In contrast , the Soviet-North Korean relations 
reached their lowest point by late summer of 1964 , while the 
Soviet-Korean state and party level relations remained for-
mal . Indirect but obvious bitter criticism of Moscow by the 
DPRK was sharply increased . Both Moscow and Pyongyang spe l l ed 
out their complaints against each othe r .  For instanc e ,  the 
North Korean l eadership showed a tendency toward s e l f-glori-
fication . The Kremlin criticized North Korea ' s  ungrateful-
ness for the a s s i s tance i t  had received . China sided with 
Pyongyang throughout the Soviet-North Korean disput e .  North 
Korean publ i c  pronouncements in 1 9 6 4  continued to stress bloc 
unity - but the equi l i t y  of each country in the social i s t  
camp , and the building of a ' s e l f-rel iant national economy by 
each soci a l i s t  country which was against the Soviet goal of 
. . t ' 1 0 3  economic integra ion . 
North Korea was under increasing pol i t ical and econo-
mic pressure by the Soviets to i solate it from the socia l i s t  
camp . It was excommunicated by Khrushchev from the interna-
. 1 c . t104 tiona ommunist movemen . Most European countries in the 
soc i a l i s t  bloc , following the Soviet line, supended their 
pol i tical and economic support for North Korea. The trea t i e s  
and agreements of economi c ,  s c i en t i fic-technical , and cultu-
102ayung-chul Koh, �· cit. , p. 77 . 
lO)Ibid. , pp. 72-76. 
104
--
Roy U. T. Kim, op. cit . ,  p .  718 . 
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ral cooperation between the USSR and the DPRK were renewed 
and Khrushchev did not recall his advisers in Pyongyang as 
he did in Be i j ing . Yet Moscow withdrew Soviet technicians 
and mili tary cooperation, and as noted , after the fall of 
1 96 2 ,  reduced economic a s s i s tance and trade drastically!0 5  
whi l e  there was a considerable increase in Chinese a s s i s t -
ance t o  and trade with North Korea : in 1 9 6 2-64 , Bei j ing pro­
vided Pyongyang with $ 1 5 0  m i l l ion in loans and in 1 9 6 4 ,  total 
value o f North Korean trade with China reached rough equa l i ty 
to that with the USSR . 106 
The Soviet economic pres sure brought to North Korea 
serious difficulties in ful f i l l ing the goa l s  of her Seven­
Year Plan ( 1 9 6 1 -6 7 ) , which caused the 1 9 6 6  extension of the 
time limit for accompl i shing the plan for three years . After 
1051he Russian econanic pressure compelled Pyongyang to increase 
its trade with non-Comn..mist countries to buy heavy industrial equipment 
which was apparently unable to buy from the USSR or other Conmunist states , 
although North Korea had no diplanatic relations with any West European 
cot.mtries; By 1964, the trade volunns began to surpass these with F.ast 
European cot.mtries . M. T. Haggard , S:· cit . ,  p .  377; t-bscow cut off gas­
oline supplies for a time. Roger Swearingen, ed. , Leaders of the Conm.i­
nist World (New York : 1he Free Press ,  1971 ) ,  p.  408; Urili'Ke the complete 
withdrawal from China, Soviet econanic and techn.oligical assistance to 
Pyongyang, however, was never totally cut off during 1962-64 pericxl. In 
Jt.me 1963, the Soviet-North Korean Corrmission for Scientific and Tecluli­
cal Cooperation was held in t-bscow. Soviet experts were still working on 
the construction of an atomic power hydroelectric plant with a capacity of 
400,000 kilowatts . It was reported in April 1963 that Soviet aid to North 
Korea was used to build a plant in Pyongyang . Far F.astern Economic Review . 
(hereafter FEER) ,  April 18, 1963, p.  143. 
106Il-pyong J. Kim, Comrunist Politics in North Korea (New york 
Praeger Publishers , 1975 ) ,  p .  109; Joseph Sang---=l'ioon Chung, op. cit . , 
pp. 110-111. 
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the cutdown of Soviet aid in 1 9 6 2 , the economic growth in 
1 9 6 3  and 1 9 64 fell far behind planned rat e s .  The output o f  
the major industrial product s  dropped below needed level s . 10 7 
The termination of Rus s ian mi l i tary a s s i stance compelled Kim 
1 1 -sung to put heavy empha s i s  on s e l f-reliant defense capabi­
l i ty . 108 The emergence in South Korea of a militantly anti-
Communi s t  regime in May 1 9 6 1 , forced the North Korean regime 
to seek for the USSR ' s  m i l i tary a i d .  After i t s  fai lure in 
Moscow to secure Russian m i l itary a s s i stance in November 
1 9 6 2 ,  the Kim 11 -sung leadership c a l l ed for greater military 
expenditures , which further damaged North Korea ' s  economic 
. . 109 s i tuation . 
Chinese economic and mili tary a s s i s tance could hardly 
meet North Korean needs for the plan . Moreover , by 1 9 64 , 
Chinese aid was to end and Bei j ing could i l l  afford to renew 
• t  . t 1 1 0  i s assis ance . In sum , Pyongyang ' s  interest suffered se-
107 Joungwon A. Kim, '"Ihe 'Peak of Socialism' in North Korea : The 
Five and Seven Year Plans , "  Asian Survey, vol. 5 ,  no . 5 (May 1965 ) , p.  
267 . 
108 Paul F. Langer, op. cit . ,  p. 151. 
109 Byung-chul Koh, "North Korea : Profile of a Garrison State , "  
Problems of Corrm.m.ism, vol . 18, no . 1 (January-February 1969 ) ,  p .  22 ; 
The defense expenses increased from 2 . 6  percent in 1962 to 10.0 percent 
in 1966 and 30.4 percent of the total annual state expenditure in 1967 . 
See Joungwon A. Kim, Divided Korea , op. cit . , p. 302 ; Donald S .  Zagoria 
and Young-ktm Kim, ''NOrth Korea aro 'ffie �or Powers , "  Asian Survey, vol . 
15 , no. 12 (December 1975 ) ,  p.  1026. 
llOChina was plagued by its own economic problems and striving 
to complement the economic setbacks which accompanied the Great Leap For-
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riously by the largely frui t l e s s  a l l i ance with China . As 
1 9 6 4  came to a c l o s e ,  the Kim I l - sung leadership was placed 
on a reapprai sal of i t s  pos ture in the Sino-Soviet spl i t .  
ward. Donald F. Lach and F.drrund S .  Wehr le, !nternational Poli tics in 
East Asia since World War II (New York : Praeger, 1975), p. 217. -
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CHAPTER I I I  
PYONGYANG BETWEEN BEIJING AND MOSCOW SINCE KHRUSHCHEV ' S  FALL 
In 1 9 6 4 ,  poli tical objection to Khrushchev was grow-
ing in the Soviet Union, and on October 1 4 ,  Nikita Khrushchev 
was removed from the Soviet leadership . 1 1 1  Khrushchev ' s  clum­
sy China policy apparantly contributed to his overthrow. 112 
The years after Stalin saw the l o s s  of Soviet control over 
the international Commun i s t  movement and i t s  uni ty . The e-
c l i pse of Khrushchev, however ,  further accelerated the pro­
c e s s  of polycentrism in the Communi s t  world by s trengthening 
China ' s  posit ion in the Sino-Soviet d i s pute whose prestige 
was increased by the explos ion of i t s  first atom bomb on Oc­
tober 1 6 ,  1 9 6 4 . 1 1 3  
11�e Khrushchev' s  fall occured at a time when only 13 parties 
accepted the Soviet invitation to the December 1964 26-parties conference 
in Moscow, six pro-Chinese parties refused to participate, and the rest 
did not reply . For the reactions of the cormunist parties to the oust­
ing of Khrushchev from the political scene, see Leopold Labedz, ed. ,  In­
ternational Comrn.mism after Khrushchev (Cambridge : The M.I .T. Press,-
1965), pp. 22-26. 
112i<urt London, ed. ,  The Soviet Impact on World Politics (New 
York Hawthorn Books , Inc . ,  1117Zi) , p.  120. 
113Tue Sino-Soviet polimics lulled temporarily with the fall of 
Khrushchev when both the PRC and the USSR explored the other ' s  sign to 
rocxierate its position in the new situation. But the Soviet reaffinned 
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Leonid Bre zhnev and Alexei Kosygin succeeded Khrush-
chev. The emergence of the new Soviet leaders launched the 
Kim I l -sung leadership on the path of a radical change in 
Pyongyang ' s  relations with B e i j ing and Moscow. As the Brezh­
nev-Kosygin team , unlike Khrushchev , emphas i zed as priority 
goals of Soviet foreign pol icy the reestabli shment of unity 
in the social i s t  bloc , a sudden opportunity was provided for 
North Korea to rebuild clo ser economic and pol itical ties 
with the USSR and East European commun i s t  countrie s ,  and to 
. R . . 1 . t . t 114 H . 1 d d th t regain ussian mi i ary a s s i s  anc e . aving cone u e a 
North Korea ' a  interest would be better served by a rapproche­
ment with the USSR, the North Korean regime was leaning to-
ward the Soviet Union, whi l e  moving to d i s engage the country 
from its s o l i d  a l i gnment with the Chine s e .  
the validity of the 20th Congress of the CPSU and soon both sides, still 
inflexible and uncompromising, resumed their ideological attacks . A. 
Ibak Barnett , China and the Major Powers in Ea.st Asia (Washington, D.C.  : 
The Brookings Institution, 1977), pp. 47=4'8 ;8ISosee William E.  Grif­
fith, Sino-Soviet Relations , 1964-65 ( Cambridge : The M.I .T. Press, 1967 ) ,  
P ·  61 .-- -- -
114For the text of Brezhnev' s  speech on 47th armiversary of the 
October Revolution, see CDSP , November 18, 1964, pp. 3-9. 
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Leaning toward Moscow 
The North Korean regime took a wai t-and-s e e  attitude 
toward Moscow upon the downfal l  o f  Khrushchev and initiated a 
warming of the Soviet-North Korean relations by sending a 
congratulatory message to the new Soviet leadership and ex-
1 1 5  tending Kosygin a invi tation to vi s i t  Pyongyang . I t  could 
safely be as sumed that the new Soviet leadershi p ,  which 
sought to improve Soviet posi tion in Asia and to entice the 
Korean comrades to loosen their t i e s  with Bei jing , facing the 
escalation of . the war in Vie tnam and the s t eadily widening 
Sino-Soviet spl i t ,  showed their intere s t  in talking with the 
North Korean leaders . 1 1 6  
The f i r s t  talks between North Korea and the Soviet 
Union to improve their relat ions were held in Moscow in No-
vember 1964 . In February 1 9 6 5 , Kosygin and Kim I l -sung in 
Pyongyang produced a joint communique in which North Korea 
acknowledged the Soviet principles of peaceful co-existenc e ,  
Kosygin pledged full support for Pyongyang ' s  independent po-
s i t i o n ,  and the two countries stressed s trengthening of their 
fri endship . I t  was quite apparant that Kosygin agreed to re-
sume mili tary aid , t o  increase economic a s s i stance to Pyong-
yang , and to cease Soviet interference with North Korean in-
115Asian Recorder, September 3-9, 1965, p .  6647. 
116Astri Suhrke ,  "Gratuity or Tyranny : The Korean Alliances , "  
World Politics , vol . 25, no . 4 (July 1973 ) , p. 527. 
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· ternal affai rs . 1 1 7  
The new Soviet leaders did not place higher value on 
North Korea than Khrushchev had, but a t  least they should 
correct the e s t rangement between Pyongyang and Moscow. On the 
North Korean side , several notable events in 1 9 6 5  .further l ed 
Kim Il-sung to reconci l e  h i s  differences with Moscow in order 
to secure foreign pol i t i cal , economic and mili tary a s s i s tance . 
The norma l i za t ion of the Japanese-South Korean relations in 
June 1 9 6 5 , was to bring Japanese pol i t ical and economic sup­
port to the South. 1 1 8  The mil i tantly anti-Commun i s t  South Ko­
rean regime agreed to send forces to South Vietnam, which was 
to increase international recogni t i on of t�e Republ i c  of Ko-
rea , and in re turn the United States increased mi l i tary aid t o  
Seoul . 1 1 9  With his m i l i tant stance on the Korean unification 
que s t i on ,  Kim I l-sung could hardly allow North Korean mil ita­
ry capacity to fall far behind that of the South. Furthermore , 
Bei jing ' s  constant unwil l ingnes s  to join with the Soviet Union 
in a united front strategy to counter the escalation of U . S .  
117 CDSP, March 10, 1965, pp. 6-8. 
118For details on the Treaty and its background, see Kwan-bong 
Kim, 'Ihe Korea-Japan Treaty Crisis and the Instability of the Korean Po­
liticar-system (NeWYorl< : Praeger, 1971), pp. 40-69; NOrth Korea's trade 
with Japan declined �ately after the South Korean-Japanese nonnali­
zation treaty, Soon-sung Cho, "Japan' s  Two Koreas Policy and the Problems 
of Korean Unification," Asian Survey, vol. 7 ,  no. 10 (October 1967) ,  p.  
714. 
119Far Eastern Economic Review : 1966 Yearbook, pp. 298-99 ;  Ches­
ter L. Coope� crusade America lllVietnam (New York : IX>dd, 
Mead, 1970 ) ,  p .  487. 
5 5  
mili tary involvement in Vi etnam probably made Kim I l-sung d i s -
i l lusioned with the reliab i l i ty of Bei jing i n  the s imilar way 
the Soviet backdown in the Cuban cri s i s  and neutra l i ty on the 
Sino-Indian border dispute in 1 9 6 2  made the North Koreans l o s e  
1 2 0  confidence in Moscow ' s  w i l l ingness t o  defend North Korea . 
Meanwhi l e ,  the Soviet pol i cy toward the Vietnam War and mili-
tary a s s i s tance to North Vietnam seemed to have al layed Pyong-
yang ' s  distrust of the Soviet leadership . 
Chinese influence in North Korea was gradual l y  re-
placed with Rus sian after Kosygin ' s  v i s i t  that was followed 
by economic and arms agreement s ,  and exchanges on a l l  areas 
between P�ongyang and Moscow. The official pre s s e s  of both 
the USSR and the DPRK praised each other and expres sed their 
C l oser Uni. ty . 1 2 1  East E N th K 1 t •  uropean- or orean re a ions , econo-
mi c ,  political and cultura l ,  a l s o  improved considerably , as 
the East European 'countri es fol l owed sui t . 1 2 2  
The Soviets signed a mili tary agreement i n  Moscow i n  
May 1 9 6 5  to supply North Korea with m i l i tary a i d  and train-
1 2°Far Eastern Economic Review : 1967 Yearbook, p. 282; The 
United States-c5egan bOffibing of North Vietnamese targets on February 7 ,  
1965. 
12�evin Devlin, ''Which side are you on ?" Problems of Cormu­
nism, vol . 16 , no. 1 (January-February 1967 ) , pp. 55-56; on ffie 17th 
amuversary of Soviet-North Korean agreement ,  see CDSP, April 16, 1966 , 
p .  19;  on the 5th anniversary of Korean-Soviet Treaty, see CDSP, July 
27,  1966, p. 19.  --
122Emst Kux, "East European' s  Relations with Asian Carnunist 
Cotmtries , "  in Kurt London, ed. ,  East Europe in Transition ( Baltim:::>re : 
. 1 2 3  A . . h d . J ing . maJor new economic agreement was reac e i n  une 
56 
1 9 6 6 , guaranting Soviet economic and technological a s s i stance , 
and a considerable increase in Soviet-North Korean trade dur­
ing the 1 9 6 7 - 7 0  period . 124 In an agreement reached in March 
1 9 6 7 ,  the Soviet Union was to increase the flow of Soviet aid 
to North Korea . By the early 1 9 7 0 s , more than 5 0  industrial 
projects in North Korea were being a s s i s ted by Soviet techni­
cians , funds , and material s . 1 2 5  In October 1 96 7 ,  economic and 
trade agreements were signed for further closer Soviet-Ko­
rean relation� �6 Al though the Soviet leadership seemed to 
have failed to meet the North Korean expectations , Russian 
economic aid played an important role in the postponed Seven-
Year Plan. The North Korean armed forces were being complete-
ly reequipped with late-model Soviet mi l i tary hardware , and 
by 1 9 7 1 , nearly a l l  of North Korean modern weapons were of 
Soviet design. 1 2 7  In 1 9 6 6 , Soviet-North Korean trade turnover 
marked more than three times that of 1 9 6 1 . 128 By 1 9 6 8 , North 
The Johns Hopkins University Press,  1966 ) ,  p. 297. 
123Tue Economist, November 6 ,  1965, p. 600; also see FEER, Jan-
uary 19, 196-r;-p. 94. 
124Far Eastern Econanic Review : 1967, p. 183. 
125Il-pyong J. Kim, Carrruni.st Politics in North Korea , p. 111. 
126 CDSP, November 15, 1967, pp. 27-28 . 
127Da.vid Rees , '"Ihe New Pressures from North Korea , "  Conflict 
Studies, no . 3 (February-March, 1970 ) ,  p .  6 .  
128v. Grebennikov, ''Korean People ' s  Democratic Economic Succes­
ses , ' '  International Affairs (Moscow) , (January 1968) , p. 84. 
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Korea ' s  ·trade with the Soviet Union was 6 8  percent of the to-
tal , while its trade with China was only 11 percent . The a­
mount of Soviet-North Korean trade in 1 9 7 0  was approximately 
one-third of a b i l l ion dol l ars , about 70 percent of North Ko-
t t 1 f . t d 1 2 9  rean o a oreign ra e .  
Moscow demonstrated i t s  friendly relations with the 
DPRK by promptly supporting North Korean s e i zure of the Ame-
rican ship Pueblo in January 1 9 6 8 , unlike B e i j ing ' s  cautious 
130 support . When the Soviet Union invaded Czechoslovakia in 
August 1 9 6 8 ,  North Korea supported the Soviet interference in 
the Czechosl ovakian internal affairs , forming a contrast to 
1 3l Bei jing ' s  bitter denounce .  Pyongyang remained s i lent in 
1 3 2  face o f  Rus sian moves towards closer cooperation with Japan. 
These North Korean reactions were safely explained by i t s  de-
pendence on Soviet economic and m i l i tary aid . 
In the field of party relations between the CPSU and 
the KWP , the normal i zation which began in 1 9 6 5  was not fol-
lowed by an immediate change in the KWP ' s  pos i t i on on the in-
ternational Commun i s t  movement , because of overcautiousne s s  
1 2 9  Young-c Kim , ed . ,  op . ci t . ,  p .  1 0 .  
130A communist grnera l ,  Jan Se jna , charged Rus s i an 
involvement in the Pueblo affair .  See Jan S e jna , �Rus sia 
Plot ted the Pueblo Affai r , "  Reader ' s  Dige s t , vol . 9 5 ,  no . 
5 6 7  ( January 1 9 7 1 ) ,  pp . 7 3-75. 
1 3 1 Byung-chul Kho , "North Korea and the Sino-Soviet 
Schi sm , "  The We stern Pol i t i cal Quarter l y ,  vol . 2 2 ,  no. 4 ( De-
cember 1909T, p p .  959-960. · ' 
1 3 2Far Eastern Economic Review : 1 96 7 ,  p .  2 8 2 .  
--
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on the part of Pyongyang , or a failure to agree on new cour s e .  
The KWP did not attend the March 1 9 6 5  preparatory meeting o f  
bloc part ies i n  Moscow. The 2 3th CPSU Congress in March 1 9 6 6  
marked a major turning point in the KWP ' s  relations with the 
CPSU and the CCP , since North Korea made decis ive move t owards 
developing relations with the CPSU . Despite the Chinese re­
fusal to send i t s  delegates , the North Korean delegation led 
by a high-ranking delegate took an active part in the Con-
1 3 3  gres s .  North Korea , against Beijing ' s  stand , stood firmly 
behind the Soviet call for a united front action in Vietnam. 
The KWP ' s  ties with East European "modern revi sioni st" parties 
were also gradua l l y  restored . From the 23rd Congress on, 
the North Korean delegations continued to appear all the con­
gres s  of East European major part i e s  in 1 9 6 6  and 1 96 7 . 134 
During the period of 1 9 6 5-68 , the DPRK enjoyed warm 
and intimate relations with the USS R ,  while maintaining cor-
rect state-to-state relations at best with the PRC . The So-
viet Union res tored i t s  leverage in North Korea, al though i t  
could not influence Pyongyang as i n  Stalin ' s  era , or even 
11: 
Khrushchev ' s .  Economic , m i l i tary and other pragmatic cons i- 1� 
derations drove Pyongyang , ideologically closer to the more 
1 3  3New York Tines , March 26 , 1966, pp. 1 and 8 .  
134Joseph C .  Kun, "North Korea : Between Moscow and Beijing , "  
The China �rterly, no. 31 (July-September 1967) , pp. 52-53. 
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revolutionary Chine s e , to lean s l ightly toward Mo scow. Kim 
I l - sung ' s  primary goal was to ful f i l l  the country ' s  economic 
plan by the end of the 1 9 6 0 s  and to s trengthen i t s  m i l itary 
capabi l i t i e s  without sacrificing pol i t ical independenc e .  
North Korean efforts not t o  lean too close to the Soviet s i de 
were made . Pyongyang ' s  detente with the Soviet Union did not 
s i gnify i t s  ideological conformi ty to Moscow. The North Ko-
rean l eadership cont inued to make clear North Korea ' s  inde-
pendent pos i tion in the Commun i s t  bloc by balancing i t s  criti­
c i sm of China with cri t i c i sm of Moscow. A North Korean edito-
rial of August 1 9 6 6  firmly proclaimed Pyongyang ' s  independ-
ence of both B e i j ing and Moscow by rejecting both revisionism 
and dogmatism and opting for Juche idea,  and stressed each 
party ' s  independence and a s e l f-reliant nati onal economy to 
. 1 .  . 1 . d d 1 3 5  Th KWP d bl . insure po i tica i n  epen enc e .  e ma e a pu i c  no-
tice of i t s  independent s tand by refusing to attend the con­
ference of world Commun i s t  parties in February 1 9 6 8 , and join­
ing the CCP in the boycott of the conferenc e . 1 3 6  The Kim I l -
sung regime ' s  success i n  internal p o l i tical consolidation and 
economic stabi l i ty made i t  possible for Kim to es tabl ish North 
Korean autonomy and independence under a l l  sort of pressures 
from Beij ing and Moscow. 
135Joungwon A. Kim, Divided Korea , p. 300, citing Nodong Shinmun, 
August 12, 1966. 
l36f"'l- • • S · Mo · F b 26 1968 2 u.1ristian cience nitor, e ruary , , p.  . 
I 1�. · .
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Sino-North Korean Schism and Rapprochement 
The close Sino-North Korean relations that began to 
cool off with Kim 11-sung ' s  sudden turnabout and Mao Tse-tung ' s  
decidedly negative reaction · to Kim ' s  moving toward the Soviet 
Union, was rapidly worsened after the 1 9 6 6  23th CPSU Congre s s . 
During 1 9 6 5 , North Korea ' s  Party organ, Nodong Shinmun , s tead­
i l y  increased hostile references toward dogmat i sm and Pyong­
yang ' s  media quit earring Chinese criticism o f  Moscow. 1 3 7  In 
August 1 9 6 5 , in obs ervance of the twentieth anniversary o f  the 
l iberation of Korea , B e i j ing elected to send a delegation led 
by a very l ow-ranking delegate , while Moscow cho se to send 
138 high-level delegates . 
The escalating s t ruggle in Vietnam and the intensify-
ing Cultural Revolution in China , which increasingly exacer-
bated the Sino-Soviet dispute , a l s o  further deteriorated the 
Sino-North Korean r i f t . 1 3 9  During the 1 9 6 6-68 period of the 
Cultural Revolut i on ,  the Pyongyang-B e i j ing contact s , e i ther 
cultural or economi c ,  were not reported . The two countries 
did not exchange delegations at many cel ebrations of national 
anniversarie s .  China continued to remind North Korea of the 
137 
P· 54. 
Joseph C. Kun, ''North Korea : Between Moscow and Beijing , "  
138wayne S .  Kiyosaki, �· cit . ,  p. 72. 
139Tue Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution which was launched 
in April 1966 aimed at rooting out the dangers in China of revisionism 
and of falling back to capitalism. Far Eastern Economic Review 1967, 
p. 147 . --
Ill\ I� ' "�I 
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threat o f  a Moscow-Tokyo-Seoul-Washington detente . Bei jing ' s  
media in August 1 9 6 6  accused North Korea o f  col laborating 
with the modern revi s i oni s t s . 140 In mid-September 1 9 6 6 , the 
Pyongyang media revealed North Korea ' s  di spleasure over the 
Chinese Cultural Revolution,  but refrained from commenting in 
exp l i ci t  term s .  The Chinese anti-technological cry for the 
"thought of Mao Ts e-tung" was vas t l y  di fferent from Kim I l ­
sung ' s goal o f  a modern , sc ient i fic , Marxi st-Leninist soci��y . 
Starting in January 196 7 , the Red Guard wall posters s l ander-
ed Kim I l-sung and attacked his s i ding with the Soviet Union , 
which provoked North Korean counterat tack . 142 The DPRK and 
the PRC recalled their ambassadors in 1 9 6 7 .
143 There was a 
report that a maritime treaty between the two countries was 
aboli shed by China in July 196 7 .
144 That armed c l ashes al ong 
tne �Sino-North Korean border had led China in 1 9 68 to seal 
out the border for a time pointed to the s tead i l y  worsening 
140Be . . .  R . l.Jl.Tig eview, 
141 Jo� A. Kim, 
August 19, 1966, p. 7 . 
Divided Korea, pp .  255 and 301. 
14�obert R. Si.rrroons ,  "China ' s  Cautious Relations with North Ko­
rea and Indochina." Asian Survey, vol . 11, no. 7 .  (July 1971 ) ,  p. 633; 
Comm.mi.st North Korea : A Bibliographic Survey (Washington, D.C. : De­
partment of 'lhe Aril1Y, 1971 ) , p .  9 I . 
143Robert A. Scalapino, Asia and the Road Ahead ( Berkeley : Uni­
versity of California Press ,  1975), p."1'3'.---niinese am&issadors had with­
drawn fran all c0Ln1tries except Egypt, and China was almost totally iso­
lated at the close of the Mtural Revolution. 
144 The Treaty was signed in 1956. Asian Recorder, August 20--26, 
1967 , p. 7868. 
S . N h K 1 t ·  145 ino- ort orean re a ions . 
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I n  late 1 9 6 9  when the Cultural Revolution drew t o  a 
clo s e ,  the Sino-North Korean friendship began to revive s ince 
Beijing , which had no choice but to regard the USSR a s  a s e ­
rious threat t o  itself because of the rapid buildup of Soviet 
forces along the Sino-Soviet border and the Russian move to 
contain China through a system of collective security in Asia 
formally proposed by Brezhnev in June 1 9 6 9 , launched a prag-
matic foreign policies and thus attempted to counteract in-
. S · t · fl ;n North Korea . 146 Th P creasing ovie in uence L e yongyang-
Bei j ing contacts resumed . A special North Korean delegation 
attended the 20th anniversary ceremonies of the founding of 
the PRC in October 1 96 9 .  
Ch.  ' 1 .  147 ina s gue s t  i s t .  
North Korea was placed on top of 
The tension along the Sino-North Ko-
rean border came to an end and China dropped i t s  c laim to the 
disputed. 148 area . North Korea sent i t s  amba s s ador to Pyong-
yang in March . In April 1 9 7 0 ,  Premier Chou En-lai paid a 
s tate visit to North Korea : Chinese-North Korean relations 
145navid Rees , ''North Korea ; China Rift , "  Atlas , vol . 18, no . 3 
( September 1969) ,  pp. 50-51. China had claimed 100 wquare miles of Korean 
territory near the Paektu t-buntain as "fraternal compensation" for the 
Chinese intervention in the Korean War, which was ignored officially by 
Pyongyang. Moscow assured North Korea that it would defend Norlth Korean 
territorial integrity. 
146'Ihe Chinese coexistence policy stressed to establish or im=-� j 
prove diplanatic relations with all countries to shift from isolation to 
internaitonal participation. Harry Harding, "China ; Toward Revolution­
ary Pragmatism," Asian Survey, vol . 1 1 ,  no. 1 (January 1971 ) , pp. 61-65. 
147New York Times, November 9, 1969, p. 6. 
148- -New York Times, November 23, 1970, p. 5.  
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were restored t o  a normal state . 149 
The Soviet extremely cautious pos i tion with respect 
to Pyongyang ' s  shott ing down an unarmed U . S .  FC- 1 2 1  in April 
1 9 6 9 , along with Moscow ' s  unw i l l ingnes s  to support Kim I l -
sung ' s  aggressive efforts against South Korea , made the North 
Korean regime reappra i s e  Moscow ' s  reliabi l i ty .  In contrast 
to the Pueblo s i tuation, Bei j ing promptly supported North Ko-
rea and attacked the Soviet reluctant endorsement only af-
ter having joined the U . S .  in frui t l e s s  searching for survi­
vors - of the North Korean version of the incident . 150 The 
common concern between B e i j ing and Pyongyang over possible 
Japanese expansion in Korea contributed to the improvement of 
their relations , as the Nixon Doctrine which announced i n  No-
vember 1 9 6 9  strongly impl ied American m i l i tary d i s engasement 
1 5 1  from Asia and the rearmament of Japan, and as the Japanese 
government proclaimed in the Nixon-Sato Communique i t s  inter­
e s t  in the security of South Korea and Taiwan. 1 5 2  Kim Il-
149New York Times , April S ,  1970, p.  11. 
150Byung-chul Koh, ''Dilenmas of Korean Reunification,' '  Asian 
Survey, vol . 11, no. 5 (May 1971 ) ,  p. 486; CDSP, May 7 ,  1969, p .  8. 
151Ri.chard Nixon, U.S.  Foreign Policy for the
-
1970s : A New 
Strategy for Peace (Washington : U.S. GOvemrrentlTinting Office ,-w?O ) , 
pp. 57 aiir5'1 ; Ralph N.  Clough, East Asia am U.S.  Security (Washington, 
D . C .  : The Brookings Institution, 1975), p.L:" -
152Tue full text is found in United States Foreign Policy, 1969-
70 (Washington : U.S.  Goverrment Printing Office ,  1971), pp. 503-505; 
New York Times, November 22 , 1969,pp. 1 and 14. 
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sung indirectly a t tacked Moscow ' s  moving to friendly relations 
with Japan at the 5th Congress of the KWP in November 1 9 70 ,  
while China continued to warn North Korea of the Soviet-Ja-
. 1 . 1 5 3  panese warming re ations . 
The Chinese regained influence in North Korea was due 
more to the Soviet status quo orientation rather than to any 
active Chinese revolutionary support for Pyongyang . There 
was l i t t l e  agreement between the two countries on the ideolo-
gical i s sues of the Sino-Soviet confl i c t .  During his vi s i t ,  
Chou conveyed China ' s  desire to restore friendly relations 
with Pyongyang , and denounced Ameri can-Japane se c o l lusion i n  
E a s t  Asia . 1 54 The joint communique produced at the end of 
Chou ' s  v i s i t  to Pyongyang expre s s ed the closer relationship 
of the two countries , but c l early revealed B e i j ing ' s  unwi l l ­
ingness to give North Korea unqua l i fied support for a new Ko-
rean War, that i s , China ' s  preference for a low-cos t ,  low-
risk foreign pol i cy . The North Korean regime ' s  request in 
October 1 9 7 0 for support of a drive South was ignored by the 
Ch. 1 5 5  ine s e .  To count erbalance Pyongyang ' s  d i sappointment , 
153New York Times , November 8, 1970, p.  5.  
154For the text of Chou' s  speech, see Beijing Review, April 10, 
1970, pp. 13-14. 
155North Korea after 1965 appeared to take advantage of the Ame­
rican preoccupation with the war in Vietnam to geverate a ''people ' s  war'' 
in the IMZ reached their high point in 196 7 .  Their afforts to start a 
war in the South was deescalated with the American move toward de-escala­
tion of the Indochina war beginning in the spring of 1968. China cau-
I 
I. 
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China signed a 1 9 7 1 - 7 6  trade agreement and economic and tech­
nical aid pact on Ontober 1 7 . 1 5 6  
The years o f  1 9 6 9 - 7 0  saw Pyongyang ' s  renewed friend-
ship with Bei j ing and thus i t s  somewhat cooled relations with 
Moscow. The Pyongyang regime in 1 9 7 0  placed on top b i l l ing in 
the press messages from the Chine se leadership which had been 
given second bill ing unt i l  1 9 6 9 . However, North Korea, sensi-
tive to the l imits of China ' s  sufficient support , economi c ,  
mi l i tary and pol i t ical , intended to maintain good relations 
with Rus s i a .  The DPRK held a neutral stance on the 1 9 6 9  S ino-
Soviet border disput e ,  and attempted to reas sure the Sovi ets 
as wel l  as the Chinese of Pyongyang ' s  independent interna-
tional pos i tion. The Soviet Union , which did not want to see 
North Korea being an ally again of the Chine se , reaffirmed 
full support for North Korea on the occasion o f  the 9th anni-
versary of the Korean-Soviet Mutual A s s i stance Treaty in July 
1 9 7 0 ,  and sent a high-ranking delegation in Augus t 1 9 7 0 ,  to 
attend the 2 5 th anniversary celebrations of Korea ' s  l iberation 
from Japa n .  In September , Moscow s i gned a n  economic coopera-
tion agreement to extend i t s  aid in the industrial develop­
ment of North Korea . 1 5 7  
tiously approved the North Korean efforts , arrl was anxious not to pro­
voke a war in Korea. The Soviets had no interests sufficient to sup­
port another North Korean offensive : a reunified Korea \\Uuld strengthen 
Pyongyang ' s  resisting Soviet control . William J. Barnds, ed . ,  'The Two 
Koreas in E.a.st Asian Affairs (New York : New York University Press ,-r9°76 ) ,  
p. 135; Young-c Kliri, ea. , op. cit . ,  p .  20. 
156Beijing Review, October 23, 1970, p. 3 ;  October 30, 1970, p . 3 .  
1�7Joungwon A. Kim, "Pyongyang ' s  Search for Legitimacy, "  Prob-
6 6  
The North Korean regime , thus , had reentered a p o l i cy 
o f  middle road which continued in the 1 9 7 0 s  in deal ing with 
the Soviet Union and China to get as much a s s i stance and sup-
port as i t  could get from both , whi l e  holding a neutral stance 
in the Sino-Soviet di spute and forbiding any foreign inter-
vention in North Korea ' s  internal affairs . 
lems of Corrrnunism, vol . 20, no . 1-2 (January-April 1971) ,. .. p. 40 ;  CDSP, 
Septemoer 15, 1970, pp. 8-9. 
I 
... 
I' 
6 7  
Korean Middle Road 
The inten s i fication o f  the Sino-Soviet r i f t  provided 
Kim I l-sung in the 19 70s with a freedom of manipulating B e i j -
ing and Moscow to pursue a policy o f  pragma t i s m .  Both the 
Soviet Union and China unsuc cesfully sought to make Pyongyang 
being more strongly behind their s ide o f  the confl i c t  through 
wooing or pressures . Yet , the two commun i s t  powers had to re-
frain from ei ther putting too much pressure upon Kim Il- sung 
to avoid driving him to the other side , or giving him the un-
quil i fied support that he wanted. 
Sino-North Korean relations further improved in the 
aftermath of Chinese opening to the United State s , with Chou 
En-lai in charge o f  Chinese foreign pol icy . 158 When the meet­
ings between Chou En-lai and K i s s inger in July 1 9 7 1  set the 
stage for Nixon ' s  v i s i t  to China , and Nixon ' s  vi s i t  to Moscow 
was also announced , the DPRK was much more concerned with the 
dramatic Sino-American detente which had enormous effect on 
a l l  Ea st Asian countries and ini t i a l ly afraid that Beij ing 
ld b d h t 1 . t . . 1 .  1 5 9 wou a an on t e s rugg e agains imperia i s m .  
158rn the late 1960s when Sino-Soviet relations had reached 
their nadir, the Sino-American opening took place . A. Doak Barnett , Chi­
na Policy : Old Problems and New Challenges (Washington, D.C.  : The Brook­
Ings Institution, 1977), p.-3-.
1590rily through some detente with Washington could China be as­
sured of admission into the UN, improved relations with Japan and West Eu­
rope , and thus echancing Chinese role in the international stage . 
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The Chinese made considerable efforts to counterba-
lance the unsettling impact upon Pyongyang of Washington-
B e i j ing rapprochement .  For instance , a Chinese representa-
tive to the Military Armi stice Commi s s ion reappeared in Pan-
munjom on the same day K i s s inger left Bei j ing , the first pre-
f f .  b 1 6 0  sence a ter a ive-year a sence . B e i j ing sent a govern-
ment and party delegation to the tenth anniversary of the 
Sino-Korean Treaty of Friendshi p ,  Cooperation and Mutual As­
s i s tanc e . 1 6 1  The PRC commi tted i t s e l f  to economic aid to 
Pyongyang through an economic agreement for mutual aid and 
economic cooperati on ,  when North Korean Government Economic 
Delegation vi s i ted B e i j ing at the invitation of the Chinese 
government . The Chinese pledged support for the North Korean 
position on Korean uni fication and other matters , and attack-
d h A . . . 1 . t d J · 1 · t . t 1 6 2  e t e merican imperia i s  s an apanese mi i ari s s .  
In September 1 9 7 1 , China s i gned an agreement for the first 
arms deliveries to North Korea s ince 1 9 5 3 . 1 6 3  
Both countri e s , however ,  celebrated the 1 9 7 1  anniver-
160New York .Times , July 10, 1971, p. 3. 
161Beijing Review, July 23, 1971, p. 5. 
162Roy U. T. Kim, ' 'North Korea ' s  Relations with the Soviet Union 
and the PRC," in Young-c Kim, ed . ,  Foreign Policies of Korea (Washington 
: Instutute for Asian Studies, 1973), p .  106; Beijing Review, August 20, 
1971, pp. 4 and 22. 
163New York Times, March 5 ,  1972, p .  5 ;  see also Robert R. Sim­
m:ms , "Northl{Qrea-7 Year of the 'Thaw," Asian Survey, vol . 12, no. 1 (Jan­
uary 1972 ) ,  pp. 30-31. 
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sary o f  the Chinese entry into the Korean War far l e s s  enthu-
siastical ly than the 1 9 7 0  commemoration had been, indicating 
the Chinese prior interest in the Sino-American relations and 
the North Korean uneasiness at Bei jing ' s  detente with the U-
nited State s .  Pyongyang seemed to acquie s c e  in the Sino-A-
merican rapprochement only after in the Shanghai communique 
of February 1 9 7 2 , China reas sured the Kim I l - sung leadership 
about the PRC ' s  continuing support of the DPRK ' s  peaceful u­
nification pol i cy based on the wi thdrawal of a l l  foreign 
troops from the South. 1 6 4  
The North Koreans then moved to u t i l i z e  the new in-
ternational atmosphere to reap maximum benefits without com-
promi sing their ideological principle s .  They aimed to real-
i z e  the removal of U . S .  troops from South Korea by creating 
a peaceful image through brief detente with Seoul , and to im-
prove the DPRK ' s  international status and introduce We stern 
technologies to achieve the economic goals of the Seven-Year 
Plan ( 1 9 7 1 -76 ) to increase industrial produc tivity by expand-
ing their contacts abroad : i t  aimed to reduce i t s  dependence 
upon the USSR and the PRC by obtaining the technology and in-
164Chong-sik Lee, ''New Paths for North Korea, "  Problems of Can­
m.mism, vol. 26 , no. 2 (March-April 1977 ) ,  p. 56 . The withdrawal o� 
merican troops was the long-regarded first and essential step in realiz­
ing North Korea ' s  fonnular for unification. 
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dustrial equipment o f  the non -Commun i s t  world. 165 
The North Korean peaceful atti tude toward the South 
was welcomed and encouraged from Bei jing as wel l  as Moscow 
which favored the maintenance of stability in the Korean Pen-
rnsula . The amicable Sino-North Korean relations were streng-
thened through an agreement for economic and technical coop -
eration reached in October 1 9 7 2 ,  Kim I l -sung ' s  unofficial 
one -day visit t o  B e i j ing and exchange vi s i t s  of their foreign 
ministers in the winter of 1 9 7 2 - 7 3 . 1 6 6  
The Sovi e t s ,  in the interest of pulling Pyongyang 
closer to their s i de ,  continued to woo the DPRK through in-
creasing their aid to and trade with North Korea, and trying 
to explo i t  the North Korean nervousness over a possible Wash­
ington-Bei jing deal at Pyongyang ' s  expen s e ,  whi l e  the Sino-
165Chong-sik Lee, "'The Detente and Korea, "  in William E.  Grif­
fith, ed., The World and the Great Power Triangles ( Cambridge, MA : M. I . T .  
Press ,  1975�p .354; In June 1972, 10 months after the first historic Red 
Cross Talks between North and South, both sides produced an agreement on 
future discussions . Chong -sik Lee, ' "The Irrpact of the Sino-American De­
tente on Korea," in Gene T. Hsiao, ed . ,  Sino-American Detente (New York 
Praeger, 19 74), p. 190; North Korean defense fudget decreased from 30 
percent in 1971 to 17 percent of the total budget in 1972. William J. 
Barns, ed., op. cit . ,  p .  · 35; Projecting its nxxierate image abroad since 
1972, and adfiering closely to Beijing ' s  line , North Korea had successfully 
expanded the number of countries maintaining diplomatic relations with the 
DPRK : from 46 in December 1972 to 90 in June 1976. In August 1975, 
Pyongyang was admitted to the nonaligned bloc, with Chinese support. See 
New York Times, August 27, 19 75, p. 9 ;  A technical revolution which was 
stressea as early as 1960 was one of the supreme tasks of the Six-Year 
Plan. The North Koreans set higher targets for the plan and expanded for­
eign trade, beginning to intensify their economic competition with the 
South. 
166Chong-sik Lee, '"The netente and Korea, I I  Ibid. ' P· 336. 
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American detente apparantly enhanced Kim ' s  bargaining power 
in Moscow to reassure Soviet a s s i stanc e .  I n  1 9 7 1 , Rus s i a  sup-
p l i ed North Korea with a vast amount of m i l i tary and economic 
aid and the two countries agreed on mutual del iveries of com­
modities and payments for 1 9 7 1 - 7 5 . 1 6 7  Soviet exports to the 
DPRK more than tripled between 1 9 6 7  and 1 9 7 1 ,  meanwhi l e ,  i t s  
imports from the North Koreans increased more s l owly. North 
Korea covered the di screpanc i e s  by the long-term, low-inter-
est loans from the Soviet s .  In July 1 9 7 1 , the 1 9 6 1  Soviet-
North Korean Treaty of Mutual A s s i s tance was renewed to 1 9 7 6 .  
Moscow media i n  December 1 9 7 1 , reaffirmed Soviet-North Korean 
economic cooperation and Rus sian a s s i s tance to the industrial 
development of the DPRK. 1 6 8  Of more than US $800 m i l l ion 
worth of arms that the DPRK had obtained between 1 9 6 4  and 
1 9 7 3 ,  three-fourths came from the USSR and the balance from 
the PRC . 1 6 9  The Soviets extended crecial support to the DPRK 
to be admitted to the World Health Organization in May 1 9 7 3 ,  
awaring o f  the Chinese valuable role in backing North Korean 
posit ion on the Korean peninsula in the United Nations . 1 70 
Top-level delegations were exchanged in 1 9 7 2  between 
167 CDSP, March 2, 1971, p. 29 ; Far Eastern Econanic Review 
1972 Yearboo'K,"'p. 252. 
168Chong-sik Lee, '"lhe Detente and Korea, "  p. 348. 
169Rinn-sup Shin, et al . ,  op. cit . ,  p. 205. 
170 Kurt London, ed. , op. cit . ,  p. 135. 
, .. 
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Pyongyang and Moscow to display Soviet-North Korean friend­
shi p .  In February 1 9 7 2  when Nixon was in Bei j ing , North Ko-
rea ' s  Foreign Mini ster Ho Tam discussed the Nixon vi sit with 
Brezhnev in Moscow, and the two sides produced a joint commu-
que in which they ' reaffirmed to further expand the fraternal 
friendship and all-around cooperation. The Sovi ets promised 
full support of North Korean peaceful approach to Korean re-
. f .  t . 171  uni ica ion. De spite its bitter criticism o f  the Uni ted 
States , Pyongyang , however ,  was s i l ent on Nixon ' s  vi sit to 
Bei jing , and continued to refuse to join Moscow in attacking 
the Chl.· ne s e . 172  H T ' · " t  t M d · o am s visi o oscow serve as a warning 
to Bei j ing and reasserted the DPRK ' s  independence in foreign 
policy . 
In the years after the Washington-Be i j ing l imited de-
tente , North Korea continued to maintain c l o s e  and pragmatic 
relations with both China and the Soviet Union, to stay stu-
diously neutral in the Sino-Soviet dispute , and to seek as 
much support as possible from the two communist powers , while 
having s l ightly warmer ties with the PRC s ince late 1 96 9 .  Si-
no-Soviet support for North Korean peaceful reuni fication po­
licy and to strengthen the DPRK ' s  international po sition was 
continued . 
171 CDSP, March 22, 1972, pp .  12-13. 
17�ew York Times, February 27, 1972, p. 31 . 
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Soviet-North Korean economi c ,  mili tary and diplomatic 
cooperation remained close through personnel and economic ex-
changes and agreements ,  including an agreement signed in May 
1 9 7 5  to extend the Mutual A s s i s tance treaty for another five 
years until 1981 . The Soviet Union was North Korea ' s  ma jor 
trading partner, and s ource of arms , foreign credit and cap-
ital goods . The USSR had supplied Pyongyang with $ 5 9 3 mill ion 
worth of economic credits for some 20 industrial pro jects 
since 1 9 7 4 .  Yet , Moscow refused to provide the DPRK with its 
most advanced mi litary weapons or weapons systems , wnich ob-
viously implied Soviet intention to prevent Kim I l - sung from 
launching a new war in Korea . 1 7
3 
Moreover ,  the Soviets im-
plici tly rejected Pyongyang ' s  claim, supported by the Chine s e ,  
that North Korea was the sole sovereign state on the Korean 
peninsul a ,  despite the DPRK ' s  objection to the US proposal 
for cross -recognition of the two Koreas by America , the Soviet 
Union, China , and Japan. In the summer of 1 9 7 3 when the Krem-
lin decided to invite a South Korean team to the world uni­
versity games in Moscow, North Korea did not send a team. 174 
173Young-c Kim and Abraham M. Halpern, ed . ,  The future of the Ko­
rean Peninsula (New York : Pra�ger, 1977 ) , p .  124. �tension oetween­
North arid South reached its peak following the US setbacks in Indochina, 
since Kim hoped to unify Korea by military means ;  Myung-sik Lee, "Korea 
in the Soviet Union' s Fast Asian Policy,''  Fast Asian Review, vol . 1 ,  no. 
4 (Winter 1974 ) ,  p .  404. 
--
174 Byung-chul Koh, ''North Korea : Old Goals and New Reali ties ,' '  
Asian Survey, vol. 14, no. 1 (January 1974 ) ,  p. 41. 
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Soviet-South Korean contacts in the 1970s annoyed Pyongyang?5 
Notable new strains in Moscow-Pyongyang relations 
were observed in 1 9 7 5  and 1 9 7 6 . Kirn Il-sung had paid a state 
visit to the PRC in the spring of 1 9 7 5 ,  but he failed to visit 
Moscow because the Kremlin decl ined Kim ' s  desire to visit to 
th USSR . t h .  B . . . t . 176  e prior o is e i J ing rip .  The media o f  the two 
states did not reveal their friendly relations . Rus sian de-
legations for some important anniversaries of North Korea 
were not sent . For instanc e ,  no t op-ranking Soviet delega-
tion appeared in Pyongyang in 1 9 7 5  for the 30th anniversary 
o f  Korea ' s  liberation from Japan. The USSR ' s  mi litary aid to 
Pyongyang was decreasing , whi le the Chinese growing : since 
early 1 9 7 5 ,  50 percent of the DPRK mi l i tary equipment had 
come from the Soviet Union and SO percent from Bei jing . The 
DPRK ' s  total arms imports had declined from $249 mill ion in 
1 9 7 3  to $ 3 2  million in 1 9 7 6 . 1 7 7  Having defaulted on $700 
mill ion o f  its obligations to the USSR, North Korea early in 
1 9 7 6 , reportedly failed to obtain further loans and trade or 
175rn June 1973, South Korea armounced its open door foreign 
policy toward ''non-hostile" carm.mi.st countries. For tvbscow-Seoul con­
tacts in rnid-1970s , see Jane P. Shapiro , "Soviet Policy towards North Ko­
rea and Korean Reunificaiton," Pacific Affairs , vol . 48, no . 3 (Fall 1975 ) ,  
p .  350. 
176Far Ea.stern Econanic Revie� : 1976 Yearbook, p. 239. 
177Gareth Porter, "Time to tald with North Korea, "  Foreign Policy, 
no. 34 ( Spring 1979 ) ,  p .  59 . 
1 7 8  economic agreement . 
While in Pyongyang-Moscow relations the years of 
1 9 7 5-76 saw a new chi l l , in Sino-North Korean relat ions 
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steadily improved through frequent exchanges of their econo-
mic and mili tary del egations and various agreements along 
with _ the complet ion of a new oil pipeline linking the two 
countries in January 1976 , cordiality was emphasi zed by Kim ' s  
nine-day Bei jing trip , which received Chine se huge public 
wel come , in the wake of the Vi etnam debac l e . On April 1 8 ,  
1 9 7 5 ,  Kim I l-sung met Mao Tse-tung in Bei j ing , probably with 
the main objectives of obtaining the PRC ' s  support of his de-
s ire for the mili tary reuni fication of Korea , and promoting 
Chinese economic a s s i stance for the financial di fficulties 
th DPRK f . t t •  f ld . d . · 1 1 1 7 9  e was acing a a ime o wor wi e economic i s .  
The two s ides i s sued the S ino-Korean communique in 
which they reaffirmed so called "blood-sealed mili tary fri end-
ship , "  and their joint struggle against imperialism.  Bei j ing 
178Young-c Kim and Abraham M. Halpern, eds . ,  �· cit . ,  p. 121; 
'IWo ma.in reasons for the paynent trouble were overba.lancOOlffiports to de­
velope its econcrny too quickly and a rise of oil price . New York Times , 
February 26 , 1976 , p. 47; By late 1975, North Korea had accUniiI'.ited 
$1,130 million foreign debts.  Its trade deficit totaled $2,000 million 
by 1975, $1, 300 million to non-camunist and $700 million to the COlllll.l­
nist cOlmtries. By 1976, North Rorean foreign debts were indicated to be 
$2,400 million. FEER, December 19 , 1975, p. 36; November 5, 1976, p .  11. 
179New York Times,  May 29, 1975, pp. 1 and 9. The Six-Year Econo­
mic Plan of NC>rtl1'XOrea was obviously behiro schedule. 
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in the communique reassured Kim of Chines e  continuing support 
by publicly recognizing North Korea for the first time as the 
"sole sovereign s tate" in Korea which the Soviet Union had 
refused to address .  China reportedly approved to deduct $150 
million in the DPRK ' s  debt to the PRc . 1 80 However ,  the Chinese 
leaders particularly stressed a peaceful solution on the Ko-
rean peninsul a .; like the Soviet s ,  favoring the maintenance 
of ·stabil ity in the region. 181  Apparantly China rejected 
Kim ' s  request for some new military commitments .  In the major 
speeches made by Vice-Premier Deng Xiaoping and by Kim, Deng 
reaffirmed the PRC ' s  support for the independent and peaceful 
unification of Korea by calling for the withdrawal of US 
forces from the South , and attacked both superpowers .  But , 
Kim Il-sung carefully avoided any open joining the PRC in 
d . M 182  enounc1ng oscow. 
Kim Il-sung could expect no help for his policy of 
confrontation and brinkmanship from Moscow or Bei jing ,  and 
during 1 9 7 6 , North Korea was being forced to reduce belliger-
ency, which was clear by the sudden move that in September 
1 9 7 6 , the DPRK at the United Nations reques ted its allies to 
withdraw North Korea ' s  uncompromi s ing resolution on Korean 
181Beijing Review, May 2 ,  1975, p. 9 .  The _Chinese feared that 
a new war in Korea woUld lead to Sino-American confrontation and Japa­
nese reannament. 
182Beijing Review, April 25 , 1975, pp. 11-14; Kim Il-s�, For 
the Inde�ent Peaceful Reunification of Korea (New York : Guardian AS= 
sociates' nc. ' 1976) ' pp. 185-8 7. 
. f .  t . 183 uni ica ion. Since the 1 9 7 1 - 7 2  Sino-American detente , 
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Pyongyang had great l y  expanded i t s  diplomatic t i e s  with the 
outside world to arouse more extensive worldwide support for 
i t s  unification policy . However , many of North Korea ' s  a l l i e s  
had been pursuing pragmatic policies of accommodation with 
Washington , and were not wi l l ing to stand behind the DPRK . 
Moreover ,  the North Korean leadership lost credibi l i ty and 
credit abroad because of the s izable foreign debt and the ex-
pulsion of a number of North Korean diplomats in October 1 9 7 6  
from the Scandinavian countri es for a l l eged involvement in 
184 i l l icit trading in alcoho l ,  drugs and tobaco .  
In sum, the Pyongyang regime had s ought pragmatic in-
tere s t s , yet merely with l imited succ e s s , through maintaining 
a middle way between Bei j ing and Moscow, and at the same time 
expanding the DPRK ' s  contacts with non-communi s t  countries to 
decrease its reliance on the two communi s t  neighbours .  North 
Korea in the mid- 1 9 7 0 s  found i t s e l f  s t i l l  in need o f  continu-
ous Sino-Soviet a s s i s tance , economic and mi l i tary as wel l  as 
political , facing unexpected serious problems such as deep-
seated financial di fficul t i e s  and diplomatic immaturity . 
183Far Eastern Econcmi.c Review : 1977 Yearbook, p.  258. 
184.New York Times , October. 21,  1976, p. 4 ;  October 23, 1976, p. 
5. West Gennany 7Ja'pan, France ,  the United States, and Sweden quit trade 
with North. Korea, because of North Korea ' s  repayment delay of its foreign 
debts fran October, 1974. 
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CHAPTER IV 
NORTH KOREAN ATTITUDE AFTER MAO 
The demise of Mao Tse-tung on September 9 ,  1976 , was 
followed by the ascent of the moderate group to power headed 
by Chinese Communist Party Chairman Hua Guofeng, who ordered 
on October 6 ,  the arrest of the "gang of four , "  and Vice Prem-
ier Deng Xiaoping . The radical group, whose ideological line 
was closer to that of the DPRK and thus whose succession the 
North Koreans apparantly favored, was soon eliminated from 
the Chinese l eadership in the wake of the purges that accom-
185 panied the consequent power struggle s .  The moderates were 
more anti-Soviet than Moscow thought and Chinese anti-Russ ian 
course remained without essential change . 186 Entering the 
post-Mao international scene with serious economic and diplo-
matic problems , North Korea continued i t s  pragmatic balancing 
act between China and the Soviet Union. 187  
185Richard L. Walker, "China ' s  Post-Mao Foreign Policy, "  Problems 
of Camunism, vol . 26 , no . 2 (March-April 1977 ) ,  p .  71 ; Both groups be­
ITeved in the desirability of both develoµrent (modernization) and socio­
econanic equality (revolution) , but they differed in the priorities they 
assigned to these. For the ideological principles and policy preferences 
of the t:YK> groups, ''moderate'' and ''radical'',  see Harry Harding, Jr. , ''China 
after Mao," Problems of Corrrrunism, vol .26, no.2 (March-April 1977 ) ,  p .  2 .  
186Harold C .  Hinton, ''Moscow and Beijing since Mao," Current His­
tory, vol. 75, no. 440 (October 1978 ) ,  p. 120. 
187Tue Six-Year Plan was extended for one year. 
Vacillating Equidistance 
Closer Pyongyang-Be i j ing Rel ations 
The Chinese leadership turnover undoubtedly aroused 
North Korean concern over Bei j ing ' s  post-Mao policy, when 
Chairman Hua did not press the Taiwan is sue , which Kim I l -
sung mentioned in his congratulatory message to the new Hua 
Guofeng l eadership ,  in his talks in October with the former 
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US Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger who was invited to 
Bei jing . 188 The Pyongyang ' s  concern was apparantly connected 
with that the DPRK in 1977  markedly increased interactions 
with the Soviet Union which adopted a hard-line resolution on 
January 3 1 ,  1977 , although maintaining to  place top priority 
on Sino-North Korean relationshi p ,  and despite recent strains 
189 and ideological di spute between Pyongyang and Moscow. 
1880iong-sik Lee , "New paths for North Korea," p.  62 . 
1891he Soviets reversed their nx:xierating tendencies of the pre­
vious year. See Christian Science MJnitor, February 2 ,  1977, pp. 1 and 
10; 1he North Korean leaders vie�ets as "revisionists ," and 
the Soviet Union saw North Korea as an extrerre case of "personality cult." 
Helen-Louise Hlm.ter, ' 'North Korea and the Myth of Equidistance, ' '  Korea 
and World Affairs, vol . 4, no . 2 ( Surmer 1980 ) ,  p. 274. 
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Premier Park Song-chol arrived in Moscow in January 
1 9 7 7 , to have a series of talks with the Soviet l eaders ex-
pected to coordinate strategy toward Washington on the Korean 
i ssue s ,  and met with a fairly cool reception : no communique 
was i s sued ; public statements on both sides were more than 
usually bland ; Park ' s  speeches dwelt on tension, but Kosygin 
spoke about keeping them down ; Kosygin called for all  foreign 
troops withdrawal from the South , yet he did not mention the 
United States by name . I t  was the first official visit by a 
high-ranking North Korean official to Moscow since 1972 . 190 
Park ' s  trip was possibly hoped by the North Koreans to signal 
Beijing of Pyongyang ' s  displeasure at recent developments in 
China . In February , a Soviet government trade delegation l ed 
by Vice-Minister of Foreign Trade I .  T .  Grishin vis ited 
Pyongyang . The Soviet press continued to s tress Moscow ' s  e-
conomic and technical assistance to the DPRK. Government , 
party, and nongovernmental delegations between the two coun­
tries were continuously exchanged . A North Korean delegation 
190Christian Science MJnitor, January 25, 1977, p.  2 ;  Jarn.iary 
28, 1977, pp. 1 am 26; CDSP, f'ebruary 23 , 1977, pp. 25'.:.26 ; North Korea 
changed its policy of conimltation in 1976 to one of conciliation in 
1977, with the Carter Administration's plan to withdraw US forces from 
the South : the July incident was quickly settled that North Korean troops 
shot down a U.S. Arrrrj helicopter losing its way. New York Times , July 14, 
il.977, p .  2 ;  July 17, 1977, pp. 1 and 4;  A goal of<llrectcontacts with 
the United States emerged as the DPRK' s  top priority in the international 
arena. In September, North Korean Vice-Premier and Foreign Minister Ho 
Dam in New York, who became the highest-level North Korean official ever 
to visit the United States , reiterated Pyongyang' s  proposals for direct 
negotiations with Washington on the Korean issues. As the year drew to 
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headed by Park Song-chol vi s i t ed Moscow i n  March for a new 
economic a i d  agreemen t .  The Soviet s ,  however , agreed only to 
1 9 1  po s t p one Pyongyang ' s  debt repayme n t  t o  1 9 8 3 . 
Alt hough the Nor t h  Korea leaders felt uneasy about 
the rapid disma n t ling of a personali t y  cult i n  pos t -Mao Bei j-
i ng ,  viewed the new C h i ne s e  leadership a s  traitors t o  Mao i s m  
and were watching w i t h  co n s iderable mi sgivings the develop -
me n t  of Be i j ing ' s  forei g n  policy and the trends i n  the C h i -
nese dome s t ic p o l icies and the economy, Pyongyang i n  t he 
years of 1 9 7 8 - 7 9  moved closer t oward China and d i s t anced i t ­
self further from the Soviet U n i o n . 19 2 The main mo t i ve of _ 
the North Korean s h i f t  from the lukewarm rela t io n s  of 1 9 7 7  
t oward a more fri e ndly rela t ionship w i t h  C h i na seemed t o  come 
from C h i ne s e  offers of increased econom i c  aid : the DPRK em­
barked o n  i t s  Second Seven-Year P la n  ( 1 9 7 8 - 1 984 ) . 1 9 3 
a close, _ ic was clear that the US policy toward Korea would not change in 
the direct ion favored by the DPRK. Pyongyang resuned its at tacks . .on Wash­
ington. 
191Far Eastern Economic Review : 1978 Yearbook, p. 222. 
192rn its shift of m:x:lerniza t ion of strategy, China had gone to 
look abroad for appropriate m:x:lels - to Ruma.nia ,  Yugoslavia, Japan, and 
even the United States. The Chinese concerns had thus begun to converge 
with those of leaders in other socialist plarmed econanies faced with the 
need to adapt the corrmand econany to the canplexities of moderniz.ation. 
See Victor C. Falkenheirn, "Administrat ive Refonn and t-bderni zation in 
Post-Mao China," Pacific Affairs ,  vol. 53, no. 1 (Spring 1980) , p. 5. 
19�ew York Tirres , December 18, 1977, p. 14. North Korea an, 
nounced far-readiing changes in Cabinet in an effort to bols ter 'its eco­
nany, having foreign debt estimated to be $1. 5 million. The general goal 
of the plan was to rrore than double the value of current gross industrial 
output both in means of product ion arrl in consuner goods. For details on 
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The plan ' s  stress on mining reflected Juche idea 
the aim was to produce a minimum of 60-70 percent of all raw 
materials domesticall y .  The North lacked oil : most of its 
oil came from the USSR, but in 1976 a new pipeline from North­
east China allowed North Korea to balance its supplies  about 
equal l y  between China and the Soviet Union . As of 1 9 7 7  
roughly half mil itary imports o f  the DPRK , both assistance 
and purchase s ,  came from the Soviet Union and hal f from China . 
But , that only the Soviets could supply sophisticated military 
equipments ,  · along with Russian economic and technical assi st-
ance , apparantly restrained Pyongyang from tilting to the Chi-
nese to the point where Moscow would decide to. sever its re-
lations with the DPRK. The USSR continued to refused to pro-
vide North Korea with the most advanced weaponry , such as 
aircraft Mig-23s or 2Ss , which had been delivered to Middle 
E t t . 194 as em coun ries . 
On the part of China that launched its  campaign to 
improve ties in As i a ,  more cordial Sino-North Korean relation-
ship became important because of the growing Soviet-Vietname s e  
tie s .  The PRC with Deng Xiaoping now in charge of Chinese 
foreign policy took a new policy to be friendlier to Pyong-
the tasks and goals of the plan, see Yun-nwan Kim, ''North Korea' s  Second 
Seven-Year Plan and Sino-Soviet Aid Policy, "  Korea and World Affairs, 
vol. 3 ( Spring 1979 ) ,  pp. 99-108; By 1978, China hacraid to spare, hav­
ing tenninated its econani.c assistance to Vietnam. Rajan Menon, "Ori.na 
and the Soviet Union in Asia, "  Current History, vol. 80, no. 468 (Octo­
ber 1981) ,  p. 340. 
194Asia and Pacific Annual Review 1980, pp. 223-224. 
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yang also probably for the purpos e  o f  drawing out any accept-
able compromises on Taiwan from the Carter Administration. 
Moreover , Bei j ing felt the need to assure Kim Il-sung , who 
was anxious about the Sino-Japanese treaty of peace and 
friendship signed in August 1 9 7 8 , and about the Sino-American 
rapprochement , of its  pledge of fealty to North Korea. In 
May 1 9 7 8 ,  Hua Guofeng arrived in Pyongyang, the first visit 
to the North by. a Chines e  head of state . 1 9 5  During his vis-
i t ,  Hua gave emphatic support for the DPRK ' s  posit ion on 
peaceful reunification and US troop withdrawal from South Ko-
rea , attacked "hegemonism;" and accused Washington of its  pol-
icy of aggression . A careful scrutiny of the speeches of 
the two countries ' leaders revealed a s light difference : Hua 
underscored the need for peaceful unification , and Kim conti-
nuously mentioned the pos s ibility of mili tary means to  unify . 
I t  was apparant that Chinese economic aid and cooperation 
with North Korea was discussed. 196 In September , Chinese 
Deputy Prime Minis ter Deng Xiaoping visited the DPRK to attend 
the 30th anniversary celebrations of North Korea , which was 
. . 1 9 7  seen a s  an effort t o  appease Kim ' s  anxiety. 
The Kim I l -sung leadership ' s  leaning toward Bei jing 
which emerged more clearly by Hua ' s  visit to Pyongyang was 
195Christian Science t-bnitor, May 8,  1978, p. 3 .  
19�New York Times, May 6 ,  1978, p .  9 ;  May 8 ,  1978, p .  5 ;  May 
11, 1978, p.-ro.--
197Foreign Broadcast Infonnation Service, Daily Report :  China 
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further strengthened when North Korean media began attacking 
the Soviet Union by using the term "dominationism , "  and in 
August 1978 , the Korean Workers ' Party organ Nodong Shinmun 
reprinted a bitterly worded Chinese anti-Russian polemi c . 198 
The Pyongyang regime stood behind the Chinese in the Vietnam­
Kampuchia conflict . North Korea in January 1979 , supporting 
the Pol Pot regime in Kampuchia , bitterly denounced Vietnam ' s  
invasion of Kampuchia , whi le refusing to condemning China ' s  
attack on Vietnam in February . Kim Il-sung hailed the normal-
ization of  relations between the United States and the PRC in 
January , despite his concern over Bei jing ' s  world view. More-
over , the DPRK failed to support the Soviet invas i on of Af-
ghanistan in December , and joined the PRC in criticizing the 
Soviet policies in Afghanis tan shortly after the invasion . 
Official Chinese statements and media continued to support 
strongly the DPRK ' s  policy , especially on reuni fication . 
North Korean and Chinese Foreign Ministers exchanged mes-
sages highly greeting the 30th anniversary of the establish-
£ S . N h K d . 1 t ·  1 t •  199 ment o ino- ort orean ip  oma i c  re a ion s .  
In supporting Bei jing on the major i ssues o f  1979 , 
(hereafter FBIS-:China) ,  September 8,  1978, p .  A/5. 
19�ew York Times, August 10, 1978, p. 38. 
199FBIS : China, October 9, 1979, p. D/1; Foreign Broadcast In­
fonnation Seroce, Daily Report :  Asia and Pacific (hereafter FB!s APPJ, 
october 9, 1979, p. D/9. -- --
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however , Kim Il-sung , s t i l l  facing economic difficulties , 
spending 3 0  percent of the total budget on defense ,  and thus 
beginning to make major efforts to facili tate economic de­
velopment of the country , successfully managed not to antago-
nize Moscow and enjeyed high-level contacts and economic aid 
from both Bei j ing and Moscow by avoiding choosing one side of  
the two communist neighbors . I t  was unlikely for Kim to ob-
tain loans from other countries except the Soviet Union . Kim 
was also apparantly unhappy with Deng ' s  failure to push 
Pyongyang ' s  case in his negotiations with Washington . 200 
On the other hand , in the winter of 1978-79 ,  Moscow, 
with a fear of Washington-Tokyo-Be i j ing alliance against the 
Soviet Union , began to show a new interest  in improving its 
relations with North Korea primarily to complete i t s  encir-
clement of China . The Rus s i ans increased economic and mil i -
tary aid. In the interests of their expansion into the north-
eastern corner of North Korea to use the port of Na jin as a 
wartime , warm water alternative in case Vladivostok was un-
usab l e ,  the Soviets increased their assi stance to Pyongyang 
to build Na jin port , a chemical plant in Unggi , and the first 
aluminum factory completed in June 1978 , and improved the 
200wall Street Journal ,  June 22 , 1979, p .  38; New York Times , 
September 5 ,  1979 , p. D9. How much aid North Korea was receiVrng frooi 
the � coom..mist countries remained veiled. North Korea had been also 
actively engaged in the non-aligned rrovement to enhance its ties with the 
third world countries . 
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201 railway and highway in that area. Although North Korea ' s  
biggest debt ( $700 million )  to any country was still  owed to 
the Soviet Union, the USSR on December 3 1 ,  1978 , signed a new 
protocol with the DPRK to increase the transportation of ex-
202 port and import goods through Najin port . Soviet media 
gave consistant , although not much empha t i c ,  official support 
for the North ' s  positions , including reunification ; inten-
sified its criticism of South Korea ; and accused China of 
1 b k.  th U S · t ·  th K · 1 2 0 3  covert y ac ing e • •  posi ion on e orean peninsu a .  
However, in April 1 9 7 9 ,  Moscow ' s  anti-Seoul . political rheto-
ric was reduced , and a formal international telephone line be-
tween the Republic of Korea and the Soviet Union was install-
ed , which was probably aimed by the USSR to play its  "Seoul 
card" against the DPRK. 204 
The North Korean leaders responded favorably to the 
Soviet signals .  Vice President Park Sung-chul visited Moscow 
in early January 1 9 7 9 , for talks on international issues 
concerning the growing cordiality between the U . S . ,  the PRC , 
Union 
201Forei�Broadcast Infonna.tion Service,
1
�ily Repcrt 
(hereafter IS : SOV), January 8, 1979, p.  M . 
202rnrs : sov, January 8 ,  1979, p. M/1. 
Soviet 
203 . I . FBIS . SOV, December 22 , 1978, p. M 1,  January 30, 1979, p .  
M/1; Februacyo, 1'97'J, p. M/1 ; February 13 ,  1979, p. M/3; February 22, 
1979, p. M/7; March 2 ,  1979, p. M/1. 
204Tae-hwan Kwak, "Recent Soviet Policy toward the Two Koreas 
Trends am Prospects," Korea and World Affairs , vol. 3 ( Sunmer 1979 ) ,  pp. 
204-205. -
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205 and Japan . The Kim Il-sung leadership ranked the Chinese 
revolution second to the Russian revolution on the anniversary 
of the October 1 Revolution in 1979 , the first t ime in yea��? 
There were frequent personnel exchanges between the two coun-
tries in the field of science and technology . In March, on 
the 30th anniversary of signing of economic ,  cultural cooper­
ration agreement between the Soviet Union and the DPRK , the 
two side confirmed their friendly cooperative relations . 
I t  was reported that the North was producing the latest Soviet 
version of the T62 tank with Russian technical a s s i s tanc e .  
The USSR had assisted in rebuilding some 6 0  industrial en­
terprises , and the north Koreans were constructing some 1 3  in-
dustrial plants with economic and technical support from the 
S . u . 207 oviet nion. 
M/2. 
205FBIS : SOJ, January 5, 1979, p. M/2; January 8, 1979, p .  
206ttelen-Louise Hunter, �· cit . ,  p .  277. 
207FBIS SOV, March 16 , 1979, pp. M/1-2. 
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Mild Tilt toward Moscow, 1 9 80-81 
During the 1980-81 period, the DPRK reversed its pre-
vious posture between Beijing and Moscow by slightly tilting 
toward the friendly Soviets  and loosening its  relatively clos­
er ties of the 1970s  with the Chines e ,  though Pyongyang con-
tinued to seek its equidis tant policy toward the two antago­
nistic neighbour powers . Mutual efforts between North Korea 
and the Soviet Union to improve their relations were main-
tained, while  Sino-North Korean relations remained normal and 
functional rather than close and emotional . North Korea con-
tinued to receive assistance , economic ,  technical , and mili-
tary as well as political , from both power s .  The Kim 11-sung 
leadership had intensified its involvement in the Nonaligned 
Movement to consolidate friendly ties with the Third World 
countrie s ,  and attempted to improve its  relations with the 
United States and Japan. 
The Chines e  economic assistance was reported not to 
be enough to come up to North Korean expectations , although 
there were indications that China reached an agreement with 
the North to increase its  crude oil deliveries to the DPRK 
from 700 , 000  tonnes in 1 9 7 9  to 2 million in 1980 ; the USSR 
provided about 1 million tonnes a year . 208 The PRC ' s  military 
weaknes s ,  which was shown in the Chinese assault on Vietnam, 
208Asia 1981 Yearbook, p .  173. 
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along with economy aroused North Korean doubt o f  i t s  reliance 
on the Chine s e .  The Kim Il-sung regime was deeply concerned 
about Bei j ing ' s  internal and external policies : de-Maoiza-
tion ; the economic reforms ; and the growing Sino-US and -
Japanese ti e s ,  and about the impications o f  the trends in 
China for Pyongyang ' s  interests : Kim Il- sung saw in the Chi-
ne se leadership ' s  downgrading of much of Mao ' s  c0ntribution 
a possible challenge to the cult of Kim , and apparantly for 
Kim the Sovi ets appeared to be more open-minded than the Chi-
nese about the succes s i on question of the DPRK ; the Chine se 
modernization strategy in economy was opposed to North Korea ' s  
highly central i zed statist system ; the close Sino-American 
links might reduce the PRC ' s  support o f  Pyongyang ' s  position 
on Korean i s sues - meanwhi l e ,  Moscow was toughening its at­
t i tudes toward the Uni ted States . 209 It was probably all 
these factors that had moved the North to the Soviets . 
209The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan led Beijing to suspend 
the talks begtm in September, 1979, on normalizing state-to-state rela­
tions with t-bscow, arrl strengthened the Sino-US ties , especially in the 
field of military. Steven I .  Levine, '"Ihe Unerrling Sino-Soviet Oxh�ict , "  
Current History, vol . 79 , no. 459 (October 1980) , p. 70; North Korea 
had gone thfOUgh significant political . changes in 1980-81. During the 
6th Congress of the Korean Workers ' Party in October 1980, it was an­
notmced that Kim Jong-il , the son of Kim Il-sung, was elected to the all­
powerfull five-man Presidium of the Politburo of the Central Coomittee of 
the KWP, which confinred the rurror since 1974 that Kim Jong-il was to be 
ordained as Kim Il-sung ' s  inheritor. Young-whan Kihl, ''Korean Politics 
in the 1980s ," Problems of Coom.mism, vol . 30, no. 5 ( September�tober 
1981 ) ,  p. 66; see also t=1.ill Street Journal ,  August 21 , 1980, p. 26 ;  Kim 
11-sung insured his son's  position as heir apparent by inserting Kim Jong­
il ' s  name into the hierarchy of 4 top Cormunist Party organizations . New 
York Tirres, October 15 , 1980, p .  4 .  
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North Kore a ,  which in February 1980 , fail ed to  join 
10 other communist and l eft wing states in publicly backing 
the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan at a sociali s t  bloc par­
l iamentary conference in Sophia and refused to support the 
new Afghan lesdershi p ,  expressed i t s  solidarity with the So­
viet-backed Kabul in a message in April to the Afghan regi��? 
Pyongyang also did not vote on a motion criticizing the Sovi-
e t  action in Afghanistan at a meeting of the Inter-Parliamen-
tary Union in East Germany in Septembe r ,  despite i t s  opposi­
tion to the presence of foreign forces in all countri e s .  In 
May 1980 , Kim Il-sung and Brezhnev strengthened the Soviet­
North Korean relations through a meeting in Belgrade on the 
occasion of Tito ' s  state funeral .  In February 1 9 8 1 , Prime 
Minister Lee Jong-ok in Moscow, who led a five-man delegation 
to attend the 26th Congress of the Communist Party of the 
USSR in March, thanked the Soviets for their strong support 
of the DPRK ' s  reuni fication policy . Lee Jong-ok in August 
visited Moscow again on his way to  Syria . 211 The Pyongyang 
regime exchanged civil messages with Hanoi , despite their dif-
ference s .  Although there was no open support for Kabul , 
North Korea made public statements of  friendship with Afgha-
nistan, and recognized the Babrak Karmul regime . The Kim Il-
sung leadership also developed very cordial relations with 
210washington Post, February 9,  1980. p. 17. 
211New York Times, August 31, 1981, p. 5 .  
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Cuba , India , and other pro-Soviet s t a te s .  The DPRK extended 
an agreement to the USSR to use i t s  N a j in port the Soviet 
long-t ime goal to obtain a year-around ice-free port in the 
h P " f " h "  d 2 2 2  nort aci ic was ac ieve • 
The Soviet and North Korean media maintained to show 
a high level of mutual support , pra i s ing the friendship and 
cooperation between the two countri e s .  The DPRK ' s  statements 
about the Soviet Union were more cordial than they had �een 
for many year s .  The Rus s ian public expr e s s i ons rai sed Soviet 
support for North Korean posi tions , including the North ' s  
criticism of the rapidly increas i ng Sino-Seoul trade and U . S .  
troop withdrawal as wel l  as Pyongyang ' s  new uni fication for-
mula , advanced at the Sixth Party Congre s s  in October 1980 , 
c a l l ing for the formation of the Democra t i c  Confederal Repub­
l i c  of Koryo , and continued to attack South Korea and the US 
role in South Korea ' s  events such as Pres ident Park ' s  assassi-
nation , the Kwangju mas sacre , and the installation of the 
2 2 3  Chun government . Moscow remained to rely on North Korea a s  
22�obert R .  Scalapino , "Current Dynamics of the Korean Peninsu­
la," Problems of Corrrrunism, vol . 30, no. 6 (November-December 1981 ) ,  p.  
28.  -
223 FBIS : SOV, January 19, 1981 , p.  C/1 ; February 5 ,  1981 , pp. 
A/6 and C/1;-r;iarch---0,- 1981 , p .  C/1; July 7 ,  1981 , pp. C/2-3; July 8, 
1981 , pp. C/1-2 ; September 28, p. CC/12 ; March 13, 1981, p .  C/3; For 
the new fonrula a� changes in North Korea ' s  proposal for t.mification of 
Korea, see N�sik Kim, "North Korea ' s  Power Structure and Foreign Poli­
cy : Im Analysis of the Sixth Congress of the KWP , "  Fast Asian Affairs , 
vol . 2 ( Spring-Sumner 1982 ) ,  pp. 130-135. -
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arms supplier in distant quarters of the globe . The Brezhnev 
leadership upgraded the rank of the delegation sent to Pyong­
yang. The Kremlin, l ike China, repeatedly stre s s ed the ex­
tent of its  economic and technical assistance to the DPRK . 224 
The Soviets  underscored that while  the Sino-North Korean trade 
had not exceeded $400 million in recent years , the total So­
viet trade with the DPRK in 1980 was $874 . 7  million, almost 
one-third of North Korea ' s  1980 total foreign trade . - Moscow 
was North Korea ' s  principal trading partner and the North 
225  Russia ' s  fifth largest Asian trading parter. I t  was re-
ported that the USSR in the period 1981-85 would provide fa-
c i lities to expand some industrial projects : the Pukchang 
thermal power plant , the Kimchaek iron works , and a major 
coal mine , and that some 3 , 000  Soviet technicians had been to 
the North. In December 1 9 8 1 , Moscow signed a protocol to 
supply a number of North Korean enterprises with technical 
aid , and increase commodity trade with the DPRK . 226  
Howeve r ,  there were no signs of  looming a genuine , 
heated friendship in the closer Moscow-Pyongyang relations 
that stemmed from the national interests of the two sides . 
The Soviet Union and North Korea mistrusted each other . The 
C/4-5. 
224FBIS : SOV, April 20, 1981 , pp. C/2-3 ; July 17,  1981, pp. 
225 FEER, June 19-25 , 1981, p. 60. 
226FBIS SOI, December 30, 1981, p .  C/4. 
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Russian leadership regarded Kim Il-sung as too independent 
and abhored Kim ' s  Stalin-like cul t .  The Soviet intervention 
in Afghanistan deepened the Pyongyang leaders ' distrust of  
the Kremlin who felt  the possibi l i ty of a threat from the 
USSR. North Korea ' s  messages to Karmal emphasized to 
s trengthen the country ' s  independenc e .  Despite the Soviet 
stress on its assistance to the North, the DPRK ' s  mas s media 
rarely acknowledged Russian .contribution . Moscow ' s  publica-
t ions seldom referred to Kim Il-sung ' s  name and gave no pub-
lie attention to the North Korean succession i ssue . Pyongyang 
got only one sentence in Brezhnev ' s  speech at the 26th Con­
gress of the CPSU in March 1981 . 2 2 7  There had been no evi­
dence of any major introduction of Soviet high technology 
equipment into North Kore a .  The Soviet Union had not endorsed 
the North ' s  call for a peace agreement with Washington and 
privately conceded a "two-Koreas" solution . 228 
Adhering to the even-handed approach to the two Com-
munist power s ,  North Korea maintained correct and proper re-
lations with Bei jing which in pursuit of i t s  policy of prag-
mat i sm had been wooing the North to counter the Soviet strat-
egy to develop a network of close relations with countries 
bordering China . Kim Il-sung in Belgrade had talks with Chi-
227 CDSP, March 25, 1981, p. 6 .  
228 Gareth Porter, op. cit . ,  p. 59. 
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nese Chairman Hua Guofeng in May 1980 . The Pyongyang govern-
ment continued to be behind the PRC on the is sue of  Vietnam 
invasion of Kampuchea by backing Prince Norodom Sihanouk of 
Kampuchea ,  a long-time friend of Beijing , and the Asean de-
mand for a Vietnamese withdrawal . Lee Jong-ok went to Beijing 
for a five-day visit in January 1 9 8 1 ,  for talks with Deng 
Xiaoping and other Chinese leaders , mainly on economic topics ,  
and expressed satisfaction with the Sino-North Korean rela-
tions . Chinese Prime Mini ster Zhao Ziyang supported the 
North ' s  position on Korean issues by urging Washington to con-
elude a peace agreement with the DPRK, and accepted North Ko-
rean invitation to visit Pyongyang - Zhao paid a state visit  
to  North Korea in December . 229  
China ' s  publications continuously gave ful l ,  ardent 
support of North Korean peaceful reunification policy call­
ing for the withdrawal of the U . S .  troops from the South. 2 3 0 . 
The PRC defended Pyongyang ' s  independence : it disfavored a 
U . S .  request  to pass on to North Korea a complaint over the 
North ' s  aleged mi s s i l e attack on a U . S .  spy plane , claiming 
that the DPRK is an independent state . Zhao Ziyang repeatedly 
accused Washington of perpetuating the division of the Korean 
P· 2 .  
229New York Times , January 11, 1981 , p. 4.  
23°For instance, see Christian Science M:Jni.tor, May 30,  1980, 
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. 1 231  peni.nsu a .  The North Korean expression "the great lead-
e r ,  Kim I l-sung" was used in the Chinese media . Pyongyang 
and Bei jing confirmed friendship and cooperation through 
their official messages on ceremonial occasions such as the 
20th anniversary of the Sino-North Korean Friendship , Coop­
eration and Mutual Assistance Treaty, the 32nd anniversary of 
the founding of the PRC , and the 3 3rd anniversary of the 
DPRK ' s  founding , and through delegation exchanges such as 
Zhao Ziyang ' s  official good-wil l  vi sit to North Korea and the 
KWP delegation to China led by Kim Yong-nam in November . 2 3 2  
In  the Sino-North Korean relations , however , signs of 
strain were emerged . The DPRK , pres sing the Chinese to stand 
firmly by principle , repeatedly expressed its  complete support 
for the union of the PRC and Taiwan, whil e  critici sm of the 
U . S .  role in Seoul remained muted in the mass  media of Beij-
ing , unlike the Soviets . Kim I l-sung in his speech at the 
Sixth Congress  of the KWP placed stress  on the need for a· 
continuation of resolute anti-imperial i s t  struggles  by point-
231FBIS : China, September 2,  1981, p. B/1 ; New York Times , De­
cember 22, 1'9'8I';" p.  3. At the 6th Party Congress, Kim-rT-sung Uriderscor­
ed autonarous foreign policy based on Juche idea. He put forward the 
three basic principles of North Korea ' s  foreign policy : indeperrlence, 
frien:lship, and peace . Pyongyang' s  stress on the principle of in:lepen­
dence in foreign relations had never been rrore explicit before. 
232 FBIS : APA, July 13, 1981, pp. D/�5; September 11, 1981, pp. 
D/6-8; Octooerl, I'9'8"1 , pp. D/1-2; Devember 1 ,  1981, p. D/1 ; December 
21, 1981, pp. D/3-7; December 23, 1981, pp. D/�7. 
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ing that no unprincipled compromise with imperialism should 
be made and the interest o f  other nations must not be sacri-
ficed to promote one ' s  own nation ' s  interest ,  which apparant-
ly referred to the Chinese rapprochement with Washington and 
233  Toky o .  The Pyongyang regime lauded Mao in a congratulate-
ry message sent to new Chairman Hu Yaobang , and underlined 
the friendly Kim-Mao relations . The PRC in 1980  cut off i t s  
oil deliveries to the North by 4 0  percent . I t  refused to re­
turn North Korean defectors . 234 
With its initiative , Bei jing had developed a trade 
link with South Korea,  a consequence of the changes in econo­
mic and political policies in China after Mao : the increas­
ing Sino-South Korean unofficial trade reached $300 million 
in 1980 and initially , such trade took place through Hong 
Kong, but lately ships reportedly had gone directly from Chi­
nese ports to the Republic of Korea - the Soviet Union had 
made only a slight opening to the South, going no further 
than permiting the occasional South Korean academician to 
participate in conferences in the USSR. Simultaneous with 
the opening o f  trade , South Korean athletes began reporting 
that their Chinese counterparts had become very cordial . 
China had also invited Seoul to send a delegation to a con-
233Nam-sik Kim, op. cit . ,  p. 136. 
234 . Jayu Shinmoon, September 29, 1982, p.1 .  
ference on energy and environmental problems to be held in 
Bei j ing in November 1982 . 2 3 5  
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235washington Post, March 14, 1982, p .  A16; Robert A. Scalapino, 
' 'Current Dynamics of the Korean Peninsula, ' '  p .  30. 
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Strengthened Ties with China 
Despite the certain signs of friction, Pyongyang and 
Bei j ing began to warm their ties since late 1981 when China 
apparantly acknowledged Kim Jong-il ' s  status through Hu Yao-
bang ' s  expression praising his work , and the North Korean 
l eadership endorsed Beijing ' s  economic and other pragmatic 
policies . 2 3 6  The DPRK seemed interested in the l iberal eco-
nomic policies of Deng and Premier Zhao Ziyang as Pyongyang 
was making no headways in solving its difficulties paying 
back $ 2 , 000 million in foreign debts : imports had risen at 
the same pace as exports , which had caused North Korea to 
2 3 7  miss mos t  of its already re-scheduled repayments .  Kim Il-
sung ' s  anxiety about the Chinese close link with the United 
States apparantly al layed by the deteriorating Sino-American 
relations as a result of U . S .  arms sales to Taiwan. 238  
As part of Beijing ' s  new global strategy connected 
with China ' s  movements to al ter i t s  foreign pol icy , the PRC. 
changed its cautious attitude toward mili tary assis tance to 
the North not to prompt Pyongyang to make adventurous moves ,  
236FBIS : China, November 30, 1981, pp. D/1-2 ; FBIS APA, De­
cember 1, 1981;-p. D/2. 
237IXmg-bok Lee, ''North Korea After Sixth KWP Congress," Korea 
and World Affairs, vol. 5 (Fall 1981 ) ,  p. 439. 
238Time, March 15, 1982, p. 27; U.S.  News & World Report, July 
26 , 1982, pp�25. 
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by providing the DPRK for the first time with more than 20  AS 
fighter planes early in 1982 , the most sophi sticated of Chi-
nese aircraft - the Soviet Union continued to fail to supply 
MIG 2 3 s  to North Kore a .  I t  was unusual for China , seeking a 
modernization of i t s  armed forces , to provide half of its an­
nual production of 40 planes to the North. I t  was reported 
that chinese economic aid to the DPRK had also increased , es­
pecially in its petroleum provision. Bei j ing quit its  trade 
with South Korea . 2 3 9  I n  sum, North Korea was being courted 
strongly by the Chine s e .  
Pyongyang allowed the PRC to use Chongjin port for 
its trade with Japan. A good will  delegation led by North 
Korean party secretary Ho Jong-suk went to Bei jing in May. 
Chinese Defence Minister Geng Biao made a nine-day vis i t  to 
the North in June as one of a series of annual military mi s-
s ion exchanges between the two countries - it was the highest  
level delegation by China to  the DPRK, impling the growing 
Pyongyang-Beijing military links . In October , Chen Muhua , 
Minister of Economic Relations wi th Foreign Countrie s ,  led an 
economic mission to North Korea and reached a trade agreement 
with the DPRK. A scientific cooperation pact was also signed 
between the two s i de s . 240 
239'llle Korea Herald, September 19 , 1982 , p. 1 .  
240FBIS : China, October 26, 1982, p. D/1; October 29, 1982, p. 
D/3; June 14,1982, p .  D/1; Jtme 21 , 1982, pp. D/1-5; FBIS APA, May 
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The clear evidence of the warming Sino-North Korean 
relations was a secret visit by Chinese Communis t  Party lead-
er Hu Yaobang and elder statesman Deng Xiaoping to Pyongyang 
in April as well as Kim Il-sung ' s  trip to B e i j ing in Septem-
her 1 98 2 .  Hu and Deng went to North Korea secretly for Kim 
Il-sung ' s  70th birthday, marking Kim ' s  birthday at the high-
est  level : other communist countries were represented at the 
celevrations only by their resident ambassadors . Hu disclos-
ed in September that leaders of the two countries in April 
agreed to visit each other frequentl y ,  exchange information 
and give mutual support . The trip to China by Kim Il-sung 
was his first planned trip outside North Korea in more than 
seven years - Kim had not vi sited Moscow s ince 1971 . A focus 
of his visit was Chinese sweeping changes in economic manage-
ment . Kim Il-sung received enthusiastic welcome . He was 
granted the rare honor of a provincial tour escorted by Deng 
Xiaoping himse l f ,  and feted by a large number of Beijing ' s  
other top leaders , including Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang. Hu 
Yaobang at a welcoming banquet called for the US troop with-
drawal from the South and praised North Korea ' s  proposals for 
reunification in the peninsul a . 241 , During the visits by Hu 
and Deng , and Kim, the Chinese indicated acceptance of plans 
17,  1982, p� D/10. 
241washington Post, September 17,  1982, p .  A26 ; The Korea Her­
ald, S'eptember 19,1982� 1 ;  The People' s  Korea, Septemoer 25, 19-sT,'" 
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for Kim Jong-il to succeed Kim I l-sung - Soviet officials had 
made disparaging ramarks on the planned succession - and will-
ingness to tolerate the personality cult in North Korea de-
spite Bei jing ' s  commitment to the principle of collective 
party l eadership . China in October screened television films 
that showed Kim Jong-il shaking hands with Deng and standing 
beside Hu. It was for the first time that Kim Jong-il appear­
ed on the Chinese Tv . 242 
In the Pyongyang-Moscow relations , some signals of 
the Soviet Union ' s  e stranging itself  from North Korea were 
seen with the strengthening Sino-North Korean l inks . In July 
1 982 , excessively defensive over the pricing and quality of 
Soviet exports ,  I .  T .  Grishin, Deputy Foreign Trade Minister,  
pointed out the Korean side ' s  failure in certain years to ful-
fill its agreements in their entirety and publicly urged 
North Korea to increase its  trade with the Soviet Union. In 
late 1982 , there was a modest breakthrough in Soviet-South 
Korean ties . Moscow and Seoul began to trade indirectly 
through Japanese ve s s el s .  Two o f f i c i a l  Sovi et d e l e g a t i ons , 
one consisted of Soviet TASS delegates and the other museum 
official s ,  including a ranking official of  the Soviet Minist-
ry of Culture , visited South Korea in October to attend con-
PP· 1-3. 
242 � Shiruroon, October 30, 1982, p. 1 ;  The People ' s  Korea, 
November 13,l:98'2, p.  4. 
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ferences held in Seoul . The visits were the first official 
Soviet presence in the South. 243 
243FBIS : SOV, July 12, 1982, pp. C/1-2 . 'Ille proportion of the 
DPRK ' s  trade with tEelJSSR in 1981 was about 30 percent of its total , 
which far surpasses the proportion of trade with China and Japan; Jayu 
Shinm:xm, October 20, 1982, p. 1 ;  FBIS : SOV, November 3 ,  1982, p.-crI. 
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Since Brezhnev ' s  Death 
Yuri Vladimirovich Andropov was elected in November 
1 2 ,  1 9 8 2 ,  to General Secretary of the Soviet Party Central 
Committee to succeed the late Brezhnev . Calling maintaining 
closer relations with both Bei jing and Moscow a consistent 
foreign policy objective , Kim Il-sung offered warmest con­
gratulations and greetings to the new leader Yuri Andropov, 
and expres sed a belief that the Soviet-North Korean tradi­
tional relations of fraternal friendship and cooperation 
would grow stronger .  However , a North Korean Party and Gov-
ernment delegation , led by vice-President Park Sung-chul , 
was sent to attend the funeral ceremony on November 1 5 ,  for 
the deceased Brezhnev, indicating the distance between the 
two communist nations - Kim I l -sung hims e l f  went to Belgrade 
in May 1 9 80 , for the late Tito ' s  funeral service s .  In the 
condolences wired to Moscow, Pyongyang stressed Brezhnev' s  
active support for the North Korean struggle for socialist 
construction and the independent and peaceful reuni fication 
245 of the country . 
Kim Il-sung , in a press  interview with the Japan ' s  
daily "Asahi Shimbun" on December 3 ,  reaffirmed Pyongyang ' s  
basic equidistant stand toward the ·ussR and the PRC , made it 
245 �-� Ilbo (Chicago) ,  November 12 , 1982, p. 1 ;  
ple '  s Korea, �emr;er -zo-;-1982, pp. 1 and 8. 
The Peo-
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clear that North Korean-Soviet friendship was s t i l l  develop­
ing favourably, and ruled out any possibi l ity of improved 
ties between Moscow and Seoul . In late December , on the oc-
cas ion of the both anniversary of the formation of the Soviet 
Union , messages of greetings , reemphasizing the DPRK ' s  bel ief 
that Moscow-Pyongyang links wil l  further strengthened through 
the common struggle against imperialism, were sent to the So-
viet leaders and Premier Lee Jong-ok led a delegation to at-
d 1 b . 246 ten ce e rations . 
Certain indications of a significant change in China ' s  
approach toward the problems on the Korean peninsula have e-
merged this year. In January , an understanding among the ROK, 
Japan, China , and the Internaitonal Civil Aviation Organiza­
tion ( !CAO) on the establi shment of a new air route , which would 
save 3 5 , 000 tones of  fuel annual l y ,  to allow Chinese aircraft 
to fly over the Korean flight information region ( FIR)  was 
viewed as a harbinger for better Seoul-Bei j ing relations . 
The Chinese decision to fly over the Korean FIR was interpret-
ed as a change in Beijing ' s  view of South Korea. Pyongyang 
failed to send a delegation to the !CAO meeting to reach the 
d d . 247 un erstan ing . 
Despite the PRC ' s  support for North Korean call for 
an immediate end to the U . S . -South Korean military exercises , 
246 'Ihe People ' s  Korea, January 15 , 1983, pp. 1 and 3 .  
247 'Ihe Korea Herald, January 16, 1983, p .  1 .  
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the Team Soirit ' 8 3 ,  and the withdrawal of U . S .  troops from 
the South, it  was observed that the Chinese actually welcomed 
the U . S .  presence in South Korea in the face of the rapid So-
viet military buildup in the Far Eas t ,  that they wanted to 
improve their ties with Seoul , but that they could not afford 
to upset the North by doing so - at l east for the time bei��� 
China had been passive about the cross-recognition proposal 
by which Japan and the United States would recognize the DPRK 
in return for Soviet and Chinese recogni tion of the ROK , 
s ince former U . S .  Secretary of  State Henry Kissenger brought 
the idea up in 1 9 7 5 . However ,  Chinese officials in March did 
not raise  objection to a Tokyo ' s  proposal for economic and 
cultural exchange between the PRC and South Korea . 249 A Chi-
nese sports official implied that Bei jing would participate 
in the 1988 Seoul Olympics by saying that the PRC would be 
represented at the four Olymoics to be held between 1 9 8 8  and 
2000 as well as the 1984 Los Angeles Olympi c  Game s ,  in an in-
. . d b h M 26  . f J · 250 terview carrie y t e ay issue o a apanese magazine . 
On the other hand , a ranking Soviet official , Vice 
Foreign Minister and Chief Soviet delegate Mikhai l  Kapi tsa , 
backed North Korean position on the peninsula by making it 
248Tue Korea herald, February 6, 1983 , p. 3;  'The People ' s  Korea, 
February 12,19'83, pp. 1 arid 6.  
249 The Korea Herald, April 10, 1983, p. 1 .  
2501he Korea Herald, Ma.y 25, 1983, p .  1 .  
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clear in April that Moscow would not accept the cross recog­
nition plan, denouncing the Team Spirit ' 8 3  joint military 
exercises , and indicating that it  would not participate in 
the 1988 Seoul Summer Olympic s . 2 5 1  One main reason for the 
Soviet support was probably to draw Pyongyang , tilting toward 
the Chines e ,  closer to Moscow. 
In May, there was the first official contact between 
Seoul and Beijing, that have no diplomatic relations , since 
the establi shment of the PRC in the late 1 940s . The Chinese 
offered to hold direct Seoul-Be i j ing negotiations on the Chi­
nese airliner hijacking incident on May 5 .  The PRC used the 
official title of South Korea and ruled out any mediation of 
third countries . An agreement reached by the two sides to 
make efforts to continuously maintain the spirit of coopera-
tion s ignified that it could be applied to normal s i tuations , 
too , such as the exchange of private personnel .  Pyongyang ' s  
news media has remained silent on the incident , whil e  Chinese 
and Russian media have given detailed reports on the hijacked 
Ch . . 1 .  2 5 2  inese air 1ne r .  
Bei j ing ' s  efforts t o  maintain warm relations with the 
DPRK were seen . On May 20 , Foreign Mini ster Wu Xueqian ar-
251Jayu Shirnnoon, April 22 , 1983, p. 1; The People ' s  Korea, A­
pril 23, 198'3";"'"P. 1; May 21, 1983, p. 5 .  
252 The Korea Herald, May 10, 1983, p. 1 ;  May 11 , 1983, p. 3 ;  
May 13, 1983-;-{). 2. � 
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rived in Pyongyang probably to allay North Korea ' s  concern 
over the Beijing ' s  contacts with Seoul . Wu was invi ted by 
North Korea ' s  vice-Premier and Foreign Mini ster Ho Dam . I t  
was speculated that the sudden visit could pave the way for 
a China visit by Kim Jong-i l  which only would take place i f  
the North ins isted . 2 5 3  On May 2 3 , the Chinese media reported 
an article written by Kim Jong-il and that he would visit 
Beijing in 1 9 8 3 ,  impling Chinese recognition of Pyongyang ' s  
2 54 move to have Kim Jong-il succeed his father Kim I l-sung. 
253 'Ille Korea Herald, May 18, 1983, p. 1; May 21, 1983, p. 2.  
254� Shinmoon, May 27, 1983, p .  1 .  
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSION 
The Sino-Soviet dispute enabled Kim Il-sung to maneu-
ver between the two communi s t  nations for North Korea ' s  own 
interests . Both Bei j ing and Moscow, which regarded the North 
as important to their security interests against each other , 
have courted North Korea to pull Pyongyang closer to each side 
since the late 1970s . Observ.ers view that North Korea stands 
to suffer most from progress in the Sino-Soviet normalization 
talks which began in October 198 2 .  On the i s sue of the pro-
cess of  Sino-Russian thaw, Kim Il-sung ' s  stress on unity and 
cohesion among the socialist countries clearly told the posi­
tion of North Korea . 255  However , North Korea was said to be-
gin to readjust i t s  policy toward the two powers , as the pro­
ceeding Sino-Soviet rapprochement decreased the effectiveness  
of  Pyongyang ' s  strategy to  play "one card" against the other. 
In April 198 3 ,  according to reports in the Japanese pres s ,  
the DPRK was seeking to open a dialogue with the United States 
to improve relations between Pyongyang and Washington - the 
Soviet Union i s  opposed to North Korea ' s  contact with the U-
2551he People ' s  Korea, December 18, 1982, p. 3 .  
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nited States . 256 
Pyongyang ' s  equidistant posture toward China and the 
Soviet Union aimed to obtain maximum support , economic ,  mili-
tary and diplomati c ,  from the two neighbour countries . The 
DPRK has always been caused to lean toward one or the other . 
In 198 2 ,  North Korea moved closer to Bei jing with the increase 
in Chinese mil itary and economic aid to the North. However,  
Deng ' s  pragmatic modernization policy would make China unable 
to supply North Korea with significant economic aid . The Kim 
Il-sung regime can not afford to antagonize the Soviets by a-
ligning itself with Bei jing , having experience in the 1960s 
that the DPRK suffered seriously from Khrushchev ' s  decision 
to cut down Soviet aid t·o North Korea in retaliation of Pyong-
yang being an ally of the Chine s e .  
I t  was reported that North Korea had sent thousands of 
workers to Siberia to earn foreign currency to solve its dif-
ficul ties in paying foreign debt s .  To offset the lack of la-
hour force in the North caused by the di spatch of workers , 
Pyongyang demanded that the PRC allow the North Koreans liv-
ing in China to return to North Korea. Bei jing , however ,  in-
dicated that it  could not acquiesce in the DPRK ' s  support of 
256The Korea Herald, April 9 ,  1983, p. 1. The North Korean-U. S .  
past efforts to open diplanatic channels have met with little success.  
The North' s  proposal for a peace treaty in March 1974 was rejected by the 
U.S. because it did not provide for participation by Seoul . In July 1979, 
the C-arter Administration' s  proposal for a tripartite conference annng 
the U.S. , South and North Korea was rejected by Pyongyang. 
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Rus sian railroad construction in Siberia for the Soviet mili-
t . N h A . 2 5 7  tary s rategy in ort east s i a .  
The Yuri Andropov leadership will maintain the late 
Soviet leader Brezhnev ' s  policy to place importance on North 
Korea , planning to establish an organization of Asian Commu-
ni st countrie s ,  similar to the Warsaw Treaty Organization . 
I t  can be assumed that Pyongyang will turn toward Moscow to 
gain military and economic support , in case it i s  unsatisfied 
with the Chinese aid . Yet , the USSR reportedly may be reach-
ing the limits of its  aid . Among the reasons are the cost of 
developing large , underdeveloped Russian areas , unfilled do-
mestic needs which limit public support for foreign assist-
ance , and the draining by such aid of Soviet much-needed hard 
currency . Therefore , the relationship between Moscow and its 
clients could come under increasing pressure as the need for 
economic aid grows . Except for Afghani stan, none i s  receiving 
significant amounts of Soviet economic aid . Some have also 
been turning toward Western sources , although the Russian 
t . . d d . t . 1 258 suppor i s  consi ere as  c r i  ica . I t  i s  unavoidable for 
North Korea , in economic difficulties such as the worsening 
food situation and unpaid foreign debts , to improve its  rela-
tions with the West  to develop agriculture as well  as indus-
257� Shinmoon, February 5 ,  1983, p. 1 .  
258Christian Science Monitor, January 4 ,  1983, pp. 1 and 8. 
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try in the country . 
The new Soviet leader Yuri Andropov ' s  stress on mili-
tary force in his inauguration speech impl ied Soviet inten-
tion to continue i t s  military buildup in East Asia and the 
259 Pacific area . The tension between Washington and Moscow 
i s  growing with Andropov ' s  direct criticism of President Rea­
gan ' s  speeches in March denouncing the Soviet Union . 260 Pro-
fessor Donald S .  Zagoria has concluded that : "An independent , 
highly nationa l i s t i c ,  and communist China will pursue its own 
fundamental interes t s  on the world scene . In the 1980 s ,  
those interests will include the normalization of relations 
with the Soviet Union to some degree , greater independence 
from the United State s ,  and a greater role in the Third Worl d .  
But s o  long as China i s  encircled and threatened by Soviet 
powe r ,  and so long as the Soviet Union remains determined to  
alter the global balance of power in i t s  favor, China will 
not be able to afford a policy of equidistance between the 
two superpowers . On the key i s sues affecting the central 
balance , China wil l  continue to lean to the Wes t . 11 2 6 1  
The Sino-Soviet relationship is  unlikely to return to 
the old amity. What is almost certain is that whi le  seeking 
4
25
.
9�-a Ilbo ( Seoul ) , November 16, 1982 , p. 4 ;  January 12, 
1983, p. 
260Jayu Shinmoon , April 8, 1983, p. 1 .  
261rxmald s .  Zagoria, "'!he lliscow-Beijing Detente," Foreign Af-
1 1 2  
more actively improved relations with the Wes t ,  including the 
United States and Japan, North Korea will continue to pursue 
its pragmati c ,  equidistant policy toward the Soviet Union and 
China , and try to play one off against the other , because of 
its needs for economic growth and military buildup as  well  as 
poli tical support of Pyongyang ' s  successor question and move­
ment against South Korea . 
fairs, vol. 61 , no. 4 (Spring 1983 ) ,  p .  873. 
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